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The traditional closed innovation model is largely supported by a regime where intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) are used to secure monopolies over inventions, with one justification being that this 
maximises profits for future innovation. In the pharmaceutical and related healthcare technology 
industries, such a regime has been criticised as impeding access to healthcare technologies and 
hampering cumulative innovation. One response to this criticism has been a shift towards a more 
open innovation model, where more permeable boundaries between organisations facilitates the flow 
of knowledge for innovation. In such a model, IPRs may be used to facilitate such knowledge flows 
rather than solely as a means of securing a monopoly, satisfying the interests of private actors to 
profits, public interest to access advanced technology, and private-public interest to further 
innovation. In this dissertation, it is explored how IPRs, particularly as patents, may be used to 
facilitate open collaborative innovation in the genomic medicine field. This relatively nascent field 
of medicine endeavours to personalise medical decisions based on an individual's genome, but in 
order to develop the necessary technologies, requires vast amounts of knowledge on the human 
genome. Many initiatives have adopted intellectual property (IP) policies that facilitate open 
innovation so as to accelerate knowledge flows and resulting innovation in genomic medicine. Herein, 
these policies are consolidated to provide a tentative IP policy framework that supports open 
collaborative innovation in genomic medicine, against which South Africa's Draft IP policy and the 
IP policy of South Africa's leading research body, the Medical Research Council, is compared. It is 
found that whilst other countries are directly addressing the issues of patenting in genomic medicine 
through legislature and case law, South Africa is yet to take comparable actions. This is reflected in 
its vague patent laws and IP policies regarding IP in genomic medicine. Though there may be 
common elements that support open innovation between the policies of international initiatives and 
those of South Africa, the lack of clarity in the South African instruments does not provide a strong 
foundation for open innovation in genomic medicine. However, as the national IP policy is still in its 
draft phase, and this policy recognises the value of protecting public health, there may be opportunity 
to amend provisions to provide the necessary direction towards open innovation in genomic medicine, 















Chapter One: An introduction to the role of intellectual property law and policy in facilitating 
open innovation in genomic medicine 
 
I. Introduction 
International treaties such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)1 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (1966),2 as well as regional instruments such as the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights3 and national legislation such as the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa 1996,4 have recognised access to healthcare as a basic human right, in 
which access to medicines is encompassed. As healthcare needs evolve, new branches of medicine 
emerge, and require existing aspects related to healthcare, such as models of innovation, to evolve. 
Such a branch is that of genomic medicine. 
Genomic medicine is a way to customise medical care to a person’s unique genomic makeup.5 
Genomics refers to the study of genomes; a genome is the entire collective of DNA present within an 
individual, which includes genes.6 Whilst each individual in a species has a standard genomic 
blueprint, each genome may vary structurally,7 resulting in different characteristics between 
individuals. These variations are termed genomic variants, and form the basis of genomic medicine.8 
In genomic medicine, genomic variation is examined to: 1) determine predisposition to disease; 2) 
tailor treatments accordingly; and, consequently 3) predict response to treatments.9 This informs 
personalised routes of medical care offered to patients from diagnosis of disease, to treatment and 
prognosis. The intention of developing such tailored care is to enhance efficiency and efficacy, 
thereby reducing adverse outcomes and maximising benefits of healthcare beyond what is currently 
achieved in conventional medicine.10 However, when juxtaposed to conventional medicine, genomic 
medicine is a relatively nascent field, requiring significant amount of research and development 
(R&D) before it can adequately fulfil the right to health. 
                                                          
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Article 5. 
2 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) Article 12. 
3 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) Article 16. 
4 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) Article 27. 
5 D M Goodman, C Lymn, E H Livingston ‘Genomic Medicine’ (2013) 309(14) JAMA 1544.  
6 World Health Organization The Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of Pharmacogenomics in 
Developing Countries (2007) (Report of an International Group of Experts) 5. 
7 Ibid 3. 
8 Ibid 5. 
9 Ibid 3.  
10 Ibid 3. 
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The fulfilment of the right to health is aided by the availability of health technologies11 as 
well as accessibility to these, as proposed by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.12 Innovation enables access to a greater range of health technologies, and is therefore 
implicated in the fulfilment of the right to health. Innovation in science is often cumulative, meaning 
that innovation is built on previous innovation or knowledge.13 Therefore, access to upstream 
knowledge and innovation is essential in driving the progression of innovation in genomic medicine. 
However, with the emergence of a globalised intellectual property (IP) regime there has been a trend 
to increase IP rights (IPRs) on such knowledge and technologies, which has received public outcry.14  
A globalised regime on IP protection has emerged from the agenda of the World Trade 
Organisation. This has been achieved by binding member states to TRIPS, which seeks to ‘reduce 
distortions and impediments to international trade’ by harmonising the protection of IPRs.15 The 
patent legislation of member states has adopted the TRIPS provisions as minima standards, despite 
the differing economic, social and political standing and interests between the countries. 
TRIPS does recognise the need of members to ‘promote the public interest in sectors of vital 
importance to their socio–economic and technological development’.16 This encompasses the 
promotion of technological innovation and the transfer of technology, to benefit producers and users, 
in a way that is ‘conducive to social and economic welfare’,17 and that balances ‘rights and 
obligations’.18 However, developing countries found that interpretation of TRIPS by developed 
countries did not promote their interests as developing countries in public health, despite its express 
provisions relating to this. Consequently, the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
(the Doha Declaration),19 which also recognises the importance of IP protection in medical 
development, emerged largely from the disgruntlement of developing countries at the WTO Fourth 
Ministerial Conference in Doha. The Doha Declaration emphasises that developing countries in 
particular should make use of the flexibilities provided in TRIPS,20 but to date, these have been used 
                                                          
11 Used as an umbrella term to include facilities, services and goods. 
12 CESCR General Comment No. 14:  The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12) 
(2000) Article 12) Articles 12(a)–(b). 
13 Y Joly ‘Open source approaches in biotechnology: Utopia Revisited’ (2007) 59(2) Maine Law Review 391. 
14 M A Heller & R S Eisenberg ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research.’ 
(1998) 280(5364) Science. 
15 Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) (1994) 320. 
16 Ibid Article 8, 323. 
17 Ibid Article 7, 323. 
18 Ibid Article 7, 323. 
19 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration) (2001). 
20 Ibid Article 4–7. 
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sparsely to meet public health needs. Thus, IP governance needs to evolve under a more pragmatic 
model that supports public and private interests.  
Pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries claim that patents allow for recoupment of high 
R&D costs and investment, which incentivises and stimulates further innovation in the field, which 
in turn may raise the standard of healthcare available to the public.21 However, patent monopolies are 
likely to arise, running the risk of restricted patient access and high costs of technologies. Thus, this 
rationale has received criticism and public outcry, as commentators view these healthcare-based 
industries as having a ‘unique’ ‘social contract with the public’ to produce health technologies.22 
Consequently, the United Nations responded by consolidating the obligations of non-states actors, 
namely businesses, to the right to health.23  
This claim of recouping R&D investment may be boosted in light of the consequences of 
stratification of consumer markets according to genomic sub-populations, to be discussed in the 
following chapters, and whether it is sound, it is undeniable that the costs of R&D and 
commercialisation are high. There are multiple results of patents, which will be discussed further in 
the following chapters, however, regarding innovation and access to innovation, patents have two 
possible effects: a) monopolies may be created where access to genomic medicine by patients is 
limited, and costs may be raised without competition; b) innovation in the field of genomic medicine 
may be stymied as R&D attempts are hindered by the threat of patent infringement, despite the claim 
that the promise of patenting spurs innovation. If the traditional business rationale of patenting to 
recoup investment for further innovation does in fact hinder R&D more than it promotes innovation, 
such a rationale may be untenable for the advancement of personalised healthcare. Furthermore, this 
traditional business rationale of patenting profusely so as to maximise profits invites contention 
around the issue of whether elements of the human genome, such as human genes, as shared biological 
features of all human organisms, are even patentable subject matter. 
The Human Genome Project ignited the discussion on gene patents. The Human Genome 
Project regarded the discovered genomic information as a public good, and promoted open access to 
this information. However, competing private firms sought to privatise the genetic knowledge that 
they had discovered. This issue of gene patenting were considered in the United States case of 
                                                          
21 Y A Vawda, B K Baker ‘Achieving social justice in the human rights/intellectual property debate: 
Realising the goal of access to medicines’ (2013) 13 AHRLJ 70–73. 
22 KM Lybecker ‘Social, ethical and legal issues in drug development, marketing, and pricing policies: 
setting priorities; pharmaceuticals as private organizations and the duty to make money/maximize profits’ in 
Cohen et al (eds) The Power of Pills (2006) 25–31. 
23 Special Representative of the Secretary-General Guiding principles on business and human rights: 
Implementing the United Nations ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (2011). 
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Association for Molecular Pathology et al v Myriad Genetics, Inc et al.24 This case concerned the 
breast cancer risk genes BRCA1 and BRCA2 (BRCA1/2) that were patented by Myriad Genetics, hence 
limiting patient access to breast cancer diagnostics based on these genes. A clear theme underlying 
this debate is: to what extent must healthcare-based companies and such non-state actors fulfil their 
unique social responsibility in lieu of their private interests to generate a profit? Clearly, a new model 
for organisational R&D is required — one that promotes what will be termed as the ‘triad of interests’: 
a) the private interest in return on investments; b) the private–public interest in rapid innovation in 
the field of genomic medicine to deliver optimal technologies; and c), the public interest in patients’ 
access to technologies in genomic medicine. A new R&D model that has been widely adopted by 
global leaders in healthcare technologies — the ‘big pharma’ — in an attempt to address the triad of 
interests, is open innovation.25 
‘Open Innovation’ is a model proposed by Henry Chesbrough where ‘firms can and should 
use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as the firms 
look to advance their technology’.26 This contrasts the traditional ‘closed innovation’ model in which 
R&D was retained in the internal structures of an organisation, whose boundaries remained 
impermeable.27 Essentially, Chesbrough calls for a bi-directional flow of knowledge — classified as 
either inbound, outbound, or coupled processes — through leveraging of R&D (which focuses 
significantly on rethinking traditional IP management).28 Open innovation has evolved as the 
literature and experiential evidence around it has grown, and has even extended to ‘open collaborative 
innovation’.29 Nonetheless, what is retained in these divergent views is that there are ‘distributed 
sources of knowledge for innovation’,30 a highly relevant feature of the genomic medicines industry. 
These ‘sources’, under an open innovation framework, need to network or collaborate to optimise the 
utility of their IP expanding innovation beyond the existing ‘closed’ and impermeable boundaries of 
the organisations. This could be highly beneficial to the advancement of innovation in genomic 
medicine, whilst satisfying the private interests of the entities involved.  
                                                          
24 Association for Molecular Pathology et al v Myriad Genetics, Inc, et al (2014) 569 USC. 
25 B H Raja, P Sambandan Open Innovation in Pharmaceutical Industry: A case study of Eli Lilli (Master of 
Science Thesis, KTH Industrial Engineering and Management, 2015). 
26 H W Chesbrough Open innovation: The new imperative for creating and profiting from technology (2003). 
27 H W Chesbrough & M Bogers ‘Explicating Open Innovation:  Clarifying an Emerging Paradigm for 
Understanding Innovation’ in H W Chesbrough, W Vanhaverbeke, J West (eds) New Frontiers in Open 
Innovation First edition (2014) 3. 
28 Ibid 13–15. 
29 Ibid 15–16. 
30 Ibid 16. 
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Genomic medicine has two central facets underlying diagnostic testing and personalised, 
genome–based treatment — basic research of genome sequences, function and location, and 
downstream development of genome-based diagnostic and therapeutic technologies. These facets 
may be suited different approaches to IP protection, which will be explored herein, so as to facilitate 
sustainable innovation.   Instead of using blanket approaches where IP protection is either abolished 
(such as in the public good argument), or where IP protection is too extensive to serve the interests 
of inventors (such as in closed innovation), an open innovation model may consider both the public 
good nature of genes and the value of downstream technologies as IP leverage in innovation. This 
may facilitate patient access to genomic health technologies, whilst promoting innovation in the field. 
South Africa (SA) has identified through its 2013 Bio–economy Strategy that innovations in 
emerging knowledge economies, such as genomics, may contribute significantly to the country’s 
future economy.31 However, it reports that ‘sustained performance of biotechnology companies has 
been a challenge’,32 calling for new innovation models that integrate issues, one of which it identifies 
as ‘access to global intellectual property and knowledge pools’.33 Thus, SA may stand to benefit from 
open innovation in terms of growing its biopharmaceutical and biotechnological industries, but will 
also need to create a favourable IP environment.  
 
II. Rationale and research questions 
As the field of genomic medicine is explored, it becomes apparent that rapid and significant 
innovation is needed to make available optimal technologies. However, as the contention surrounding 
access to conventional medicine and IPRs illustrates, researchers may face challenges in accessing 
knowledge and upstream innovations that are essential to advancing genomic medicine technology. 
However, as it will be explored, IPRs also have a role in the open innovation model. A consolidated, 
multi-faceted open innovation concept endeavours to expand innovation through the use of IPRs, and 
reduce the burden on healthcare entities such as companies and universities (where burdens may 
range from costs to human capital and skills), optimising the benefits to all stakeholders, including 
patients, and fulfilling the triad of interests posited above.  
 This study therefore endeavours to examine the role of IP law, policy and management in the 
open collaborative innovation model that facilitates innovation in and access to genomic medicine, 
so as to fulfil the right to health as delineated by international law. In order to achieve this, the role 
of IPRs under the traditional, closed innovation model that has received criticism for blocking 
                                                          
31 Department of Science & Technology The Bio-Economy Strategy (2013). 
32 Ibid 14. 
33 Ibid 21. 
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essential knowledge and upstream technologies is explored. This highlights, from an IP perspective, 
why there is a shift to an open innovation model that uses IPRs differently. The value of open 
collaborative innovation in genomic medicine is substantiated using existing initiatives, and it is 
examined through IP policies how IPRs are used in these initiatives to create sustainable open 
innovation. Using these policies, a consolidated open collaborative innovation policy that can be 
suited to the different aspects of genomic medicine is provided.34 This consolidated policy is then 
used as a reference in brief analysis of the amenability of major policy influences in SA to open 
collaborative innovation in genomic medicine in the country. 
 
III. Research outline 
The body of the dissertation will be constructed of five chapters, including the introductory and 
conclusory chapters. In Chapter One, the topic is introduced and the background and rationale of the 
study is presented. This is followed by a Literature Review detailing the main sources of literature — 
mainly primary works — that are relevant to answering the research question.  
 Chapter two introduces the concept of genomic medicine will be developed and juxtaposed to 
conventional medicine. This juxtaposition elucidates how R&D needs for innovation differs between 
the two, partially justifying a shift in healthcare innovation. In outlining these R&D needs, there is a 
concentration on the role of large–scale genomic research projects, such as the Human Genome 
Project, databases and biobanks in facilitating the generation of genomic knowledge that can be used 
to downstream R&D. 
In Chapter Three, the concept of a closed innovation model and how IPRs in genomics has 
traditionally been used to support his model is introduced. The public good nature of genomic 
knowledge is also explored, and the value of limiting IPRs use so as to promote access to essential 
research tools such as genome sequences is highlighted. There is an examination of various cases in 
which patents on genomic elements, such as genes, have been challenged on the basis of hindering 
future innovation and restricting patient access, providing a rationale for a shift in how IPRs is used 
to promote innovation whilst expanding access to genomic knowledge and technologies.  
 In Chapter Four, the paradigm of open innovation will be explored, with a focus on open 
collaborative innovation. The rationale for using open collaborative innovation in the field of genomic 
medicine is substantiated, and there is an exploration of the IP policies of initiatives to establish how 
IP may be used to further the objectives of openness in genomic medicine innovation. Through this 
exploration of policies, a consolidated IP policy that supports open innovation is provided,35 and used 
                                                          




to analyse the IP policy climate within the South African context, focussing on SA’s national IP 
policy and the IP policy of a leading body of research, the SA Medical Research Council.    
 The last chapter, Chapter Five, will conclude this study by listing the limitations to the study 
and recommendations for future researchers to consider. The conclusory remarks on the role of IP in 
open innovation that facilitates innovation in, and access to, genomic medicine, will be presented to 
close this chapter. 
 
IV. Literature review 
In this literature review, the major authoritative patent legislature and litigation in genomic medicine 
that illustrate the use of IPRs under a closed innovation model, and the divergent approaches to 
genome patenting adopted by various jurisdictions resulting from the lack of an international 
consensus on the matter are identified. This forms part of the substantiation for shifting to the open 
innovation model proposed by Chesbrough. Following this is an outline the evolution of 
Chesbrough’s open innovation into the model of open collaborative innovation that will be used in 
this dissertation. The various initiatives and authoritative bodies whose IP policies are used to 
highlight the groundwork that is being laid for open collaborative innovation in genomic medicine 
are then introduced. Subsequent to the introduction of these policies, it is substantiated as to why 
South African has been chosen as a focus country in this dissertation as there is a paucity of IP law 
and policy supporting open collaborative innovation in genomic medicine in the country. 
 
(a) The Global Intellectual Property Rights Regime 
A starting point for any critique of genome patenting and its effects on innovation is the TRIPS 
Agreement, which binds member states to its provisions and aims to ‘reduce distortions and 
impediments to international trade’ by harmonising the protection of IPRs in a manner that does not 
allow these rights to hamper ‘legitimate trade’.36 The two underlying principles of TRIPS include the 
National Treatment and the Most–Favoured–Nation–Treatment provisions that essentially seek to 
harmonise the protection of IPRs amongst member states by extending state provisions to nationals 
of all other states. 37   
Though TRIPS arises from a trade agenda, it also recognises the need of members to ‘promote 
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
                                                          
36 TRIPS Agreement (note 15 above) 320. 
37 Ibid Articles 3-4. 
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development’, 38 which includes the public interest to protect public health.39 This is reiterated in the 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (the Doha Declaration), which also 
recognises the importance of IP protection in medical development.40 Both TRIPS and the Doha 
Declaration also emphasise the use of flexibilities to protect public health, especially regarding 
compulsory licensing and parallel licensing,41 although commentary on this suggests these not are 
not exploited, opening the avenue for new models that facilitate technological development and 
address public health interests.42 
The IPRs provisions of TRIPS are meant to be interpreted in light of its objectives of Article 
8 mentioned above, but have been criticised as being open–ended, minima standards,43 leading to 
divergent approaches to patenting in specific technological industries. Genome patenting is a 
pertinent case where it is observed that various jurisdictions have opposing views that could affect 
innovation in genomics differently. Two prominent examples are that of the US and the EU. The 
EU’s Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions44 (the EU Directive) 
recognises the EU’s primary obligations set out in TRIPS, and in its preamble, takes a pro-trade 
outlook, indicating the importance of IP protection in trade and industrial development. Subsequently, 
it provides clear grounds for the patenting of biological material, including genome sequences 
isolated from humans, taking a stance that promotes maximum patent–eligibility within the 
conditions of patentability set forth in TRIPS. 45  However, the US Patent and Trademark Office takes 
an opposing stance to patenting isolated genome sequences, following the judgement of the Myriad 
case in the US, where a number of claims based on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes were challenged 
on the grounds that they are not patentable subject matter under section 101 the Title 35 of the US 
Code, following that the isolated genes are products of nature, and thus patent-ineligible according to 
the law at hand.46 These dissimilar provisions highlight the need for sound and clear patent law that 
                                                          
38 Ibid Article 8, 323. 
39 TRIPS Agreement (note 15 above) Article 8. 
40 Doha Declaration (note 19 above) Article 3. 
41 TRIPS Agreement (note 15 above); Doha Declaration (note 19) Article 5. 
42 K J Strandburg ‘Accommodating user innovation in the international intellectual property regime: A global 
administrative law approach’ (2009) Acta Juridica 283-318. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection 
of biotechnological inventions (1998). 
45 EU Directive (note 45 above) Articles 3(1), 5(2). 
46 K Sevick ‘U.S. patent office floats new biotech-friendly guidelines’ (19 December available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/12/us-patent-office-floats-new-biotech-friendly-guidelines), accessed 
on 15 April 2017. 
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addresses patenting of the various forms of DNA and associated molecular structures, uses of these, 
and associated methods claims.  
A review of the literature on genome patenting, in light of TRIPS, highlights the need to a 
comprehensive legal international consensus on patenting in genomics that fulfils the objectives to 
protect public health and promote technological development as set out in TRIPS and the Doha 
Declaration. However, the structure of such a consensus determines how innovation will be 
conducted, and law and policy reform should be cognisant of the emerging models of innovation that 
digress from the traditional closed model.  
(b) An Evolved Concept of Open Innovation 
In his 2003 paper, Chesbrough introduces the concept of open innovation in the firm as that based on 
inbound and outbound flow of knowledge, 47 and in his subsequent work, he evolves the concept of 
open innovation by incorporating more recent reconceptualisations, including Gassman and Enkel’s 
coupled innovation where knowledge is simultaneously inbound and outbound.48 Chesbrough 
proposes the following definition of open innovation as ‘a distributed innovation process [primarily 
of R&D spill–overs] based on purposively managed knowledge flows across organizational 
boundaries, using pecuniary and non-pecuniary mechanisms in line with the organization's business 
model’.49  
 Chesbrough then incorporates divergent views on open innovation that transgress his firm–
centric model. These views include innovations of a public good nature that arise through ‘distributed 
social division of labour’, as proposed by von Hippel, 50 particularly termed as ‘open, distributed 
innovation’ and ‘open collaborative innovation’.51 Both open innovation and open collaborative 
innovation are based on the notion of ‘distributed sources of knowledge for innovation’.52 Open 
collaborative innovation is offered as a feasible, evolved model of open innovation in genomic 
medicine by various initiatives, as commentators debate the public good nature of genomic 
knowledge,53 yet also recognise the need to incentivise private actors in collaborations. 
                                                          
47 Chesbrough (note 26 above). 
48 Chesbrough & Bogers (note 27 above; 13). 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid 16. 
51 Ibid 15. 
52 Ibid 16. 
53 F Huzair & T Papaioannou ‘UK Biobank: Consequences for commons and innovation’ (2012) 39 Science 
and Public Policy 501. 
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Commentators suggest that open collaborative innovation has the potential to capture value both for 
private and public actors, and to accelerate the biotechnological advancement.54  
 Though there is a relative paucity of evidence of the success of open collaborative innovation 
in genomic medicine when compared to more established open practices in industries such as the 
software industry, many open initiatives in genomics have emerged that lay the foundation for future 
insight into the success of open collaborative innovation. Two such examples are that of CAMBIA’s 
BIOS55 and the 100 000 Genomes Project (100KGP). Both these initiatives emphasise in their policies 
the crucial role of their genomic biobanks and databases in generating meaningful genomic 
knowledge and allowing for knowledge flows. 
Established in 2004, the BIOS initiative, based in Australia, seeks to use collective and 
distributed innovation to create sustainable and equitable economic and social development in the 
biological sciences. 56  Though its focus has largely been on agriculture, BIOS does recognise the 
need to address public health, and its innovation policy is worthwhile to examine as it incorporates 
an open innovation approach. Its objectives are seek not only to recognise public-good norms in the 
biological sciences, but also to ‘adapt new inclusive IP sharing mechanisms’ that do not allow the 
appropriation of public goods.57 These two objectives indicate that BIOS does not employ a narrow 
view on open innovation, and endeavours to include interests to use research tools to innovate, and 
public and private interests to capture value from innovations through dissemination of knowledge 
and technologies and commercialisation. Importantly, BIOS distinguishes between research tools and 
downstream applications,58 forming a crux of this dissertation — that research tools such as genome 
sequences should be public goods to maximise innovation of downstream technologies that need to 
be commercialised. BIOS seeks to achieve this commercialisation in a manner that does not restrict 
further access and innovation through patenting, but looks for alternative IP sharing mechanisms.  
Firstly, BIOS seeks to create an understanding of the current patent IP landscape amongst its 
users, and has created a cost–free, public–access database of patents in the EU, US, Australia and 
through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) — BIOS intends to extend the range of jurisdictions. 
Through its patent database and informatics tools, BIOS creates a means by which to guide policy 
through ‘analysis of patterns of IP development, protection and ownership’.59 BIOS favours open–
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access licensing of CAMBIA’s IP, and endeavours to identify core technologies that need to be 
developed.60 To support such development, BIOS will create a cyberspace — an internet–based 
platform where researchers and developers can communicate to facilitate open collaborative 
innovation. It is for these reasons that BIOS is a suitable candidate for the study of open collaborative 
innovation. 
The 100KGP is a genomic database established by the UK Department of Health company, 
Genomics England, in 2013, and is a key initiative discussed by the University of Cambridge’s Centre 
for Science and Policy.61 It aims to compile and own the genomic and clinical data of patients with 
specific diseases, and make these available for use by third parties either freely (if parties are 
members) or for a reasonable and fair fee.62 Though it is not directly a platform for collaborative 
innovation, as with BIOS, its IP and access policy is notable as is it more aligned to a business model 
that seeks to generate a profit for public benefit. The IP and access policy for this project is tiered: 
academic and public-sectors researchers are required to join the Genomics England Clinical 
Interpretation Partnership (‘GeCIP’), and private companies are to join the Genomics Expert Network 
for Enterprises (‘GENE’) Consortium.63 Each tier is subject to different rules on IPRs and access, and 
licensing and payments. This tiered approach considers the different roles potential collaborators 
have, that is, whether their strengths lie in generating basic knowledge or in developing this 
knowledge into commercial applications, aligning with the crux of this dissertation that an innovation 
model needs to accommodate both the public good nature of genomic knowledge and the private 
good nature of its downstream applications. The 100KGP does achieve openness through fair and 
reasonable licensing, fully/partial open–access databases, capture of social value, and dissemination 
of knowledge through management of IPRs,64 and for these reasons, is considered as a significant 
initiative in this dissertation topic.   
These initiatives provide valuable insight into the IP policies that engender openness in 
collaboration, but are restricted to the boundaries of the initiative. Policy and guidelines need to 
extend beyond an entity to a national and even international phase, as illustrated by the OECD’s 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Genetic Inventions,65 a source which ultimately provides a platform 
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for the integration and balancing of innovation, IPRs and genomic medicine. Licensing is identified 
by Chesbrough as a key element to open innovation,66 and the Guidelines discuss best practices for 
licensing genetic inventions in healthcare,67 defining ‘genetic invention’68 beyond that tackled in the 
case law mentioned above.69 It explores the value of genetic innovation (which is included in genomic 
invention) in human healthcare and economic growth,70 and explores the collaborative and 
cooperative nature of innovation. In its objective to balance the IP system, the guidelines outline 
licensing that: a) occurs in an ‘economically–rational’ manner; b) comply with competition law; and 
c), balance the ‘interests of society, shareholders and stakeholders’.71 The overarching themes under 
which ‘Principles and Best Practices’ are discussed all have a role in the structure of open 
collaborative innovation, and include: licensing generally, healthcare and genetic inventions, research 
freedom, commercial development, competition.72 Whilst the premise may seem idealistic, the 
Guidelines provide further insight and solutions where possible in the ‘Annotations’,73 and is a 
valuable foundation for national, regional or international IP policy that can foster openness in 
innovation. 
 
(c) Open innovation in South Africa 
South Africa is a developing country with the status of an emerging market and leader in 
biotechnology R&D investment, as found by Gastrow in his quantitative study of the South African 
biotechnology sector.74 However, in this study, which is partially based on patent data, Gastrow finds 
that South Africa’s biotechnology R&D profile is small by international standards, with Jordaan’s 
concurring finding that biotechnology innovation of SA as compared to other countries has been 
‘modest’.75 Furthermore, Jordaan observes an asymmetry between the involvement of the private and 
public sectors in biotechnological innovation, which has not been amended by prior policy revisions 
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such as that of the 2001 National Biotechnology Strategy or the 2013 Bio-Economy Strategy.76 As 
discussed above the current Bio-Economy Strategy sees the value of genomics in the economy, but 
reports that ‘sustained performance of biotechnology companies has been a challenge’,77 calling for 
new innovation models that integrate issues, one of which it identifies as ‘access to global intellectual 
property and knowledge pools’.78 From this statement, an open innovation model may find a place in 
building SA’s bio-economy. 
In another study, Gastrow observes that literature on open innovation focussed on developed 
countries, and addresses this by conducting a study of open innovation in the South African 
nanotechnology, biotechnology and software industries.79 He finds that whilst the biotechnology 
sector is ‘highly networked and highly collaborative’, current public policies ‘do not take sufficient 
advantage of this’, and encourages the development of public policy that supports network–
building.80 As the Draft Intellectual Property Policy of SA Phase 1 (2017)81 is still in its early stages, 
and there are no major research bodies with policies geared towards open innovation in the 
biotechnology sector, there is a window of opportunity for SA to drive its public policy towards open 
innovation.   
 
V. Research design and methods 
The design of this study is based on desktop research of primary and secondary sources. Primary 
sources include, but are not limited to, international treaties and agreements, national 
legislature/policies/strategies, case law, empirical research of journal articles and original reports, and 
patent databases. Review of secondary sources mainly involve journal articles, reports and 
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Chapter Two: Understanding the Principles of Genomic Medicine 
 
For centuries, patents as a form of IPRs have been granted for inventions in various fields of 
technology as a reward for innovation by private parties, and as an incentive to disclose the invention 
for the sake of public interest.82 These inventions derive from the application of knowledge, for 
example, the principles of physics were applied to the invention of the aircraft. Over the years, 
knowledge has evolved, and new fields of technology have emerged. In the biological sciences, one 
such field is genomics, which is the study of the genomes of species and individuals. The genome is 
the entire DNA content found in an individual, which includes their genes — the unique set of 
instructions for the various functions and characteristics of an individual.83 Genomics has led to the 
emergence of genomic medicine — a branch of personalised medicine where medical decisions are 
based on the unique characteristics of an individual’s genome. As a relatively nascent field, genomic 
medicine requires extensive innovation that is rapid and cost-effective. Innovation begins at the stages 
of research and development (R&D), and extends through to the commercialisation of a product for 
use by the consumer.84 Traditional proprietary-based models of innovation, loosely termed as ‘closed’ 
innovation, is when a firm is responsible for the entire innovative process, and is in this way the sole 
owner of any IPRs that is applied to the innovation — this will be explained further in the following 
chapters.85 Though the closed model has reaped significant advancements in the past, industries have 
recognised the pitfalls of this type of model — namely, that it is costly and that IPRs may impede 
follow-on developments by blocking research and development (R&D) using patented technologies. 
Thus a new model of ‘open’ innovation, based on the flow of knowledge and technology that will be 
elaborated on below,86 in which IPRs could play a more conducive role in innovation and access to 
emerging technologies, may be better suited to the progression of genomic medicine.  
However, before it is understood how IPRs can be used in an open innovation model to further 
genomic medicine, the facets of the field itself will be explained, that is, what is genomic knowledge 
and what are its applications, and how has IPRs thus far been applied to these facets under the 
traditional proprietary model. In this chapter, in order to understand genomic knowledge and its 
applications, a brief explanation of the science of genomics and genomic medicine will first be 
presented. This will be followed by an exploration of the historical development of genomic 
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knowledge and its significance as a research tool in genomic medicine, and a description of the current 
structures that contribute to the generation of this knowledge. Following this understanding of 
genomic knowledge, the IPRs issues regarding genomic knowledge, and the impact this may have in 
a closed innovation model will be explored in Chapter Three. 
 
I. Conceptualising genomic medicine 
The field of genomic medicine is a relatively new concept in healthcare, although it is closely aligned 
with another field — genetic medicine — which has provided the foundation for genomic medicine. 
Similar to genomic medicine, genetic medicine is also a branch of personalised medicine. Genetic 
medicine entails the making of medical decisions regarding the treatment of a disease based on a 
patient’s specific genes.87 As discussed below, a gene for a particular characteristic can have many 
variations, such as the gene for eye colour. As it will be seen with genomic medicine, this requires 
genetic testing and therapies tailored to genetic variations of a patient. An example pertinent to 
genetic medicine would be in breast cancer, where specific variations of the breast cancers genes 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 confer a greater susceptibility to breast cancer in women.88 Genetic medicine 
has, in the past few decades, garnered much attention regarding the influence of IPRs on innovation 
in and access to the technologies of this field.89 Using the above example of BRCA1 and BRCA2, a 
landmark case emerged in the US when Myriad Genetics, the company holding the patents for these 
genes claimed that other companies who were offering commercial genetic testing for these genes 
were infringing on their patents.90 In this case, the attention centred on how these claims of 
infringement would affect the provision of genetic testing to the public, and further innovation in 
breast cancer research using the genetic data from these tests.  
Genomic medicine is also raising the question of whether the traditional, proprietary-based 
‘closed’ innovation model is sufficient to meet private and public interests. However, before 
answering whether a shift is needed in the innovation model, and how IP can facilitate this model, an 
understanding of the nature of genomic medicine and how this nature may lend itself to more ‘open’ 
innovation will be provided. ‘Open’ innovation is the flow of knowledge and technologies between 
innovation entities, changing the requirements of closed innovation from that which necessitates that 
an entity perform all the innovative activities (from R&D to commercialisation), to that which allows 
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for a networking and sharing of these activities.91 This may be valuable in a highly complex, 
knowledge-based and high technology field such as genomic medicine, and will be explored in greater 
detail in the following chapters. In this section, a brief background into the science of genomics and 
genomic medicine and its link to genetics and genetic medicine will be provided, which will be 
reiterated in the following chapter where some of the IP issues relating to genetics will be extrapolated 
to genomics. The use of genomic knowledge as a research tool in downstream applications, such as 
pharmacogenomics, is also discussed, providing an understanding that genomic medicine comprises 
of essentially two facets which may lead to different approaches under an open innovation model.  
(a) A scientific background to genomics 
As early as 1963, an Expert Committee of the World Health Organization (WHO) noted that ‘genetic 
considerations add a new dimension to public health work: a concern not only for the health and 
wellbeing of persons now living, but also for … generations yet to come’.92 In the past few decades, 
genetics and genetic medicine are fields that have been deliberated at length not only by health 
organisations, but by intellectual property authorities as well, who have considered how IPRs should 
be applied in these fields. As science progressed, genetics research was taken further, and the field of 
genomics emerged. Both these fields are based on the gene, a concept that will be explored below. 
A human being is composed of trillions of cells, each containing the same set of genes.93 A 
gene encodes the ‘master instructions to build, repair, and maintain humans’ in a cell.94 The cell uses 
these instructions to produce functional molecules, such as proteins, for specialist functions — for 
example, a liver cell will be instructed by a subset of genes to produce proteins that perform the 
functions of detoxifying ingested compounds, and a white blood cell will be instructed by a different 
subset of genes to produce antibodies proteins fight off infections.95 Essentially the gene is a molecule 
consisting of DNA — a nucleic acid made up of nucleotides, or bases.96 A single strand of DNA 
forms a structure called a chromosome within the nucleus, along which many genes are located at a 
specific locus on the chromosome. The four bases of DNA occur in sequences which may differ in 
order and length, resulting in a code; it is for this reason that genes are called ‘coding’ DNA.97 This 
variety of sequences in the genes arises in differences in the instructions given to the machinery of a 
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cell, a simple example being that a gene for blue eye colour instructs the relevant cells to produce a 
blue pigment, whereas a variation to that gene may result in a green pigment being produced. The 
roughly 23 000 genes of a typical human are found in the 23 pairs of chromosomes,98 although 
between these genes are also stretches of ‘junk’ DNA — that is DNA that has no apparent coding, 
regulatory or structural function, and is probably the result of inefficient evolution.99 Only about 2% 
of the human genome contains the genes that encode for other functional molecules such as proteins; 
100 the remaining 98% is junk DNA. As each half of each chromosome pair is received from each 
parent’s reproductive cell during sexual reproduction, genes are actually inherited and passed down 
to future generations.101 
In his New York number one bestseller, The Gene: An Intimate History, Siddhartha 
Mukherjee suggests as follows regarding the concept ‘gene’: ‘one of the most powerful…ideas in the 
history of science: the “gene,” the fundamental unit of heredity, and the basic unit of all biological 
information.’102 This is a reasonable viewpoint, as genes encode the characteristics of individuals that 
makes them different in how they look, behave and interact with their environment. These differences 
conferred by genes have been identified as the future of medicine by tailoring medical decisions based 
on the genetics of individuals. Now science has introduced the term ‘genomics’ to the concept of 
personalising medicine.103 So what is the link, and what does genomics have to offer to healthcare? 
As stated above, genes are coding regions of DNA, and genetics is primarily concerned with 
the study of these coding regions. However, the DNA of chromosomes also includes regions that do 
not code for specific characteristics (termed non-coding DNA, which includes junk DNA), or that is 
required for structural or regulatory purposes in the cell.104 A genome consists of all the DNA in an 
organisms, as introduced above, which includes coding, non-coding, structural and regulatory 
DNA.105 Though it is often confused with genetics, genomics differs subtly from genetics. Whereas 
genetics is the study of a single gene or a small number of genes and their associated functions and 
disorders, genomics studies the entire genetic constitution of an organism.106 These studies include 
identifying the structure, function, location and evolution of the genetic elements of the genome. 
                                                          
98 World Health Organization Medical genetic services in developing countries: The ethical, legal and social 
implications of genetic testing and screening (2006) 7. 
99 E Lawrence Henderson’s Dictionary of Biology 14 ed (2008) 344. 
100 World Health Organization (note 106 above; 15). 
101 Campbell (note 83 above; 426-434). 
102 S Mukherjee (note 94 above; 9). 
103 Goodman, Lymn & Livingston (note 5 above; 1544). 
104 Campbell (note 83 above; 426-434). 
105  Campbell (note 83 above; 426-434). 
106 World Health Organization Genomics and World Health (2002) 32-36. 
22 
 
Furthermore, genomics considers the interactions of chromosomes with each other and with other 
environmental factors.107 This allows for researchers to study complex, multi-factorial diseases such 
as diabetes, cancer and cardiovascular diseases.108 The study of genomes (or ‘genomics’) includes 
understanding the structure, function, mapping and evolution of genomes, which will enable scientists 
to understand the multiple genetic factors contributing, together with environmental interactions, to 
certain diseases. 
Many developments in genomics have been made since the 1950s, and this field is still 
expanding. A critical development has been the Human Genome Project, led as a public initiative by 
the National Human Genome Research Institute.109 In the Human Genome Project, researchers 
compiled a representative genome of the human genome by sequencing and mapping the genes of 
many individuals, providing a comprehensive reference database for future research.110 Sequencing 
refers to uncovering the order of the bases in a gene, which codes for specific RNA and possibly 
proteins.111 Mapping refers to identifying the location of genes along the chromosomes so as to 
produce a ‘genetic map’.112 As Mukherjee suggests, understanding genes (and by extension, 
genomes), ‘tantalizes us with the prospect of controlling our bodies and fates’.113 However, as will 
be discussed below, understanding genomes results in the development of knowledge which must be 
regulated. This knowledge can then be applied to produce technology that has a utility for society. 
How this knowledge and these applications is governed and protected, and how this protection allows 
for the development of the field through innovation, forms the crux of this dissertation.  
(b) Understanding the nature of genomics medicine  
Human genomics knowledge has been applied to the healthcare setting, resulting in the field of 
genomic medicine, a branch of personalised medicine, as introduced above. The inherent diversity 
seen between individuals of a species can be largely attributed to variations in genes. Genetic 
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variation in humans arises from mutations and processes of sexual reproduction, where the nucleotide 
sequence of a gene may be altered.114 These processes produce gene variants, or alternative forms of 
a gene, which may alter an instruction given for a specific function, for example, a variant may 
instructs that more antibodies are produced, or may instruct for the production of a dysfunctional 
protein.115 Gene variants can be classified according to their effect, that is, they may be protective, 
neutral or risk variants.116 Risk variants increase the susceptibility to disease, whereas protective 
variants decrease susceptibility to disease. Neutral variants do not appear to provide an advantage or 
disadvantage.117 The study of these variants is the basis of genomic medicine. Some diseases are 
caused by alterations to one gene, and are called Mendelian or monogenic diseases; these are the 
subject of genetic studies.118 Others are polygenic, which means the risk variants of many genes are 
involved in disease progression.119 Often, polygenic diseases are multifactorial, i.e. there is a genetic 
component to the disease as well as an environmental component, which includes the external 
environment as well as the interactions that occur with noncoding DNA sequences and other 
molecular structures in the cell environment.120 Examples of such diseases include heart diseases, 
mental illnesses, diabetes and cancer.121 Due to the involvement of multiple genes and the cell’s 
environmental factors, which together contribute to genomic variation, genomics provides a better 
understanding of how these genetic and environmental factors interact in the cell to cause disease, as 
opposed to identifying and studying these genes in isolation to each other and other factors.122  
In genomic medicine, variations in the genome are used to optimise patient diagnosis, 
treatment and prognosis, and reduce side effects and risk of inefficiency.123  This is based on the 
premise that the diagnosed diseases have a significant genomic basis. By understanding the genomic 
component of disease progression more clearly, in conjunction with patient history, presentation of 
symptoms and laboratory testing, a more accurate route of treatment can be chosen for the patient.124 
This may involve pharmacogenomics, where a pharmaceutical treatment is administered depending 
on the genomic constitution of an individual (which may affect the response to the treatment). This 
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application will be discussed further in subsequent sections. In this way, it can be seen that genomic 
medicine has been taken a step further than conventional medicine, which has only been able to use 
presentation of symptoms, patient history and laboratory tests of non-genetic factors. This means that 
conventional medicine has had to employ blanket, ‘trial–and–error’ approaches to treatment upon 
diagnosis, an approach which runs the risk of being ineffective or toxic to the individual.125 
Additionally, genomic medicine also has a strong preventative medicine component — 
genetic testing is employed to predict the likelihood of developing a disease based on an individual’s 
genes.126 This enables healthcare professionals to design a route of preventative measures to delay 
disease onset before onset of disease; in this way, genomic medicine seeks to reduce reactive 
medicine (that is, treating a disease only upon presentation of symptoms), in favour of preventative 
medicine.127 Conventional medicine has endeavoured to develop a preventative approach to 
medicine, for instance, statins are used to lower cholesterol to prevent cardiovascular disease, but 
genomics medicine will be able to more accurately and timeously inform the preventative 
interventions strategy, with less reliance on patient and family history and presentation of symptoms, 
which may be incomplete.128   
The ultimate goal of genomic medicine is to have the patient’s genomic profile (that is, the 
data on all the patient’s genes and other genetic material) available to the physician so that a route of 
treatment can be chosen that will minimise harms and maximise benefits to the patient. Hence, it is 
apparent that genetic testing is a tenet of this approach. The development of genetic diagnostic 
technologies will have to progress simultaneously with genomic treatment technologies; that is, as 
new diseases emerge, or at least, as genes are identified that correlate with specific diseases and are 
recognised as targets in treatments,129 there must be sufficient capability to diagnose whether an 
individual possesses those specific genes responsible — the example of DNA microarrays relates to 
this and will be discussed below. A genetic test may not be confined to only direct analysis of genetic 
material, but may also include testing for a gene product like protein.130 These genes and gene 
products will then have to be available for ensuing R&D of genetic diagnostic technologies.  
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Whilst this focus on the patient necessitates the profiling of an individual’s genome, 
understanding the data of this profile requires extensive R&D. The structure, function, location and 
evolution of genes and their variants, as well as the rest of the DNA within the genome needs to be 
clarified and understood in relation to diseases. As with any scientific study, this requires large-scale 
studies in order to derive accurate and statistically significant information. This requirement 
emphasises the importance of genomic databases — databases storing the information pertaining to 
individuals’ sequenced and mapped genomes — in future medical practice. The databases, which will 
be discussed below, could also store information on the environmental factors to which a patient is 
exposed, strengthening the study of multifactorial diseases that are often the subject of genomic 
medicine.  
What is critical to note from this discussion is the nature of genomic medicine with regard to 
its two technological components: genomic knowledge (such as DNA sequences and associated 
disease risk), and the diagnostic and therapeutic technologies that emerge downstream to this 
knowledge. The examples of these are briefly discussed so as to create an appreciation for the 
essential nature of genomic knowledge in genomic medicine innovation.  
(i) Pharmacogenomics and DNA microarrays: the application of genomic knowledge 
In genomic medicine, genomic knowledge can be applied to downstream diagnostic or therapeutic 
technologies, mentioned above. The examples of DNA microarrays and pharmacogenomics are used 
to illustrate the necessity of genomic knowledge in both these types of technologies, respectively.  
 Pharmacogenomics is the study of how genomes affect a person's response to medications in 
order to develop effective and safe medications, tailored to a person's genomic makeup.131 These 
medications may be existing medications that are tested in different genomic sub-populations, or may 
be new medications that are developed using genomic knowledge. An example of this would be the 
highly popular medication used to prevent heart attacks and strokes, Plavix.132 Using knowledge on 
the variation of the gene CYP2C19, researchers realised that certain variants of this gene could not 
metabolise Plavix, resulting in the FDA issuing a warning that patients should get tested for these 
variants.133 This emphasis on genomic testing relates to the second technology, diagnostic technology. 
 Diagnostic technology may be used in a clinical setting where a patient’s genomic profile is 
captured for further use in treatment decisions, or in research studies, where, using the example of 
pharmacogenomics, the data generated may be used in the development of downstream applications. 
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However, these diagnostic technologies rely on the incorporation of DNA sequences into their 
hardware.134 An example of this is DNA microarray technology, where a collection of DNA ‘spots’ 
are placed on a solid surface. These spots are the DNA sequences of specific genes or other elements 
of the DNA that are under study, and are used to determine the expression of elements in, for example, 
disease or treatment response.135 This will help determine how the gene influences disease 
progression or responds to medical treatment.  
 These are not the only example of how genomic knowledge is essential to the development of 
downstream applications — other examples include genome therapy where the genome is altered. 
Nonetheless, even without extensive exploration of the downstream technologies, the vital 
importance of genomic knowledge as a research tool can be appreciated, and it for this reason that 
the focus of this dissertation is on the impact of IP on genomic knowledge generation and its use. 
 
 
II. Generating genomic knowledge for application: an insight into genomic databases and 
biobanks 
 
As noted above, genomic knowledge is a critical component of genomic medicine, providing research 
tools that can be applied to addressing diseases with a genomic component. The first major step in 
uncovering this knowledge was seen in the Human Genome Project and in the concurrent efforts by 
the private company Celera Genomics, under the direction of Craig Venter, to do the same.136 These 
examples are discussed below to illustrate these landmark efforts by the public and private sectors, 
highlighting the need for both, as critical in the advancement of genomic medicine. 
(a) The Human Genome: uncovering the reference genome 
The Human Genome Project was a 3-billion-dollar, 15-year public initiative,137 ‘brought about by 
‘international cooperation, scientific excellence and altruism’ which led to the production of a 
‘curated and accurate’ reference sequence for the human genome,  referring to an abstraction of the 
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typical genome of a human being.138 This led to the cataloguing of a ‘parts list ’of most human genes, 
and thus most human proteins and other important elements, integral for this understanding of system 
biology.139 The human genome thus described is a mosaic of the genomes of many research 
participants, and whilst each and every individual has their own unique genome, what the Human 
Genome Project and other similar projects demonstrated is that individuals of the human species 
shared distinct elements.140 Individuals have different variations of genes, which confer varying 
characteristics, but the location and function of these genes in a normal human profile is the same.141 
Thus, whilst genomic medicine relies on the sequencing of an individual’s genes, it is the ‘master’ 
information on gene location and function provided by projects such as the Human Genome Project 
that allows for the holistic application of this sequencing data in genomic medicine. However, the 
information provided by the Human Genome Project alone is not sufficient for the translation of 
genomic data.142 Further data needs to be collected especially on gaps left in the Human Genome 
Project, such as undiscovered variants, and experimental analyses needs to be conducted to 
adequately annotate the genome (that is, to indicate the particular gene variant sequenced in the 
genome, the chromosomal environment, and the functional implications of these factors on the 
production of downstream molecules).143  
 Genomic medicine focusses on genomic sub-populations that are characterised according to 
their genomic variation. In both conventional medicine and genomic medicine, studies have statistical 
power when the sample sizes of the studies are large enough. The statistical power of a test in a study 
is the probability that the test will correctly detect a difference, if the difference actually exists.144 
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 An example in genomics medicine could be in a study of whether gene variant X influences 
progression of disease Y. In a small sample of 10 individuals with X, 9 may have Y. This suggests that X 
influences progression of Y. But in a much larger sample of 1000 individuals, only 300 may have Y. An 
appropriate sample size would be one that yields a result that will be seen even if the sample size is 
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However, due to the blanket, ‘one–size fits all’ nature of conventional medicine, this is much easier 
to achieve — often study cohorts are selected from a provincial or national region. In genomic 
medicine, variations in genes and possible other factors that affect genome function stratify research 
samples into variant sub-populations. This may mean that research has to extend to a national or 
global scale to achieve significant statistical power.145 Additionally, research that is performed at a 
global level could identify links between diseases and smaller genomic sub-populations — links that 
may otherwise remain undetected in smaller scale research. To facilitate such genomic research, as 
seen in the Human Genome Project, ‘a powerful new set of research tools, resources and supporting 
technologies’ is needed.146 This includes not only sample data, but also ‘highly sophisticated, 
substantial database infrastructures’.147 Therefore, countries and global consortia have created 
mechanisms like genomic biobanks and databases to collect, store and use genomic data samples. 
Essentially, these databases contain upstream technologies (or research tools) which will facilitate 
innovation in downstream technologies such as pharmacogenomics.  
 The Human Genome Project followed an open approach to data sharing and used open source 
software.148 The international cooperation and altruism of this project has been praised by those who 
maintain that genomic data should be placed in the public domain and should not be privatised.149 
 Proponents of this stance maintain that the human genome is part of the common human 
heritage and belongs to all people, and should be made freely accessible to the public.150 This claim 
will be explored further in the following chapter. However, much has to be said about the privately–
run human genome project led by Craig Venter and his team in Celera Genomics. In 1998, Venter 
started Celera Genomics and announced that his company would also sequence the human genome 
using a different, newer sequencing technique, as he felt the efforts of the Human Genome Project 
was too costly and was taking longer than necessary.151 Unlike the Human Genome Project, Celera 
intended to privatise its genome sequences granting access to these data only to paying customers, 152 
and through patenting roughly 100–300 genes that were important to drug development, although 
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approximately 6 500 place-holder patent applications were initially filed (and later relinquished).153 
As this was contrary to the public-spiritedness of the Human Genome Project, the race was on to 
complete the sequencing of the human genome.  
 In the beginning of 2000, both Celera and the Human Genome Project made a joint public 
announcement that they had each completed a working draft of the human genome, although there 
were still gaps to be filled by both contenders.154 This announcement was made together with the 
joint declaration by US President Bill Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair that all genome 
information should be free to the public.155 In 2001, the Human Genome Project published its findings 
in Nature, with Celera publishing its findings a day later in Science.156 By 2003, The Human Genome 
Project had completed its final draft of the human genome, and Celera agreed to make its sequences 
available for non-commercial use, although it limited the amount of data that could be downloaded 
at any given time.157 Unfortunately, in 2002, Venter was removed from his presidency at Celera, and 
pursued improving the application of personalised medicine through sequencing his own genome 
with a slightly different goal to Celera or the Human Genome project.158 Whereas Celera and the 
Human Genome Project concentrated on sequencing one chromosome of each pair of chromosomes 
in the complete set, Venter decided to sequence both chromosomes in the 23 pairs.159  
 This entry of a private competitor may well have galvanised the efforts of the Human Genome 
Project, suggesting that private entities could have a necessary role in creating sustainable models to 
undertake extensive, time-consuming and costly R&D needed before genomics medicine can become 
a primary route of medical care.160 As stated by Venter, ‘business is the way to drive science forward, 
and people are finding there’s no difference in the goals or outcomes, because for science to impact 
society, it has to be economically viable’.161 Celera and the Human Genome Project ran parallel to 
each other, yet it is likely that they influenced the accomplishment of each other’s goals. It is possible 
that creating a symbiosis between the public and private domains through an open innovation model 
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could accelerate the field of genomics medicine even more. This will be explored further in Chapter 
Four. However, before exploring the innovation model that may accelerate the field, the aspects that 
individually contribute to the development of genomic medicine are identified in the following sub-
section. 
(b) Genomic databases and biobanks: creating research tools for innovation 
When considering that the roughly 23 000 genes of the human genome is only about 2% of the 
genome,162 and considering the multitude of diseases implicated in genomic medicine, it is not 
difficult to acknowledge the amount of R&D that will be needed to develop this medical field. This 
R&D will require an extensive amount of genomic data and samples from which this data can be 
obtained. The infrastructural requirement to capture and store such data and their associated samples 
may be ‘huge’.163 It is likely that it is on these grounds that biobanks and large genomic databases 
have secured a place in the field of genomics research. 
 Biobanks are repositories of samples from living organisms, which are used in studies to 
generate information that is stored in databases. This may include genomic data on gene variants and 
other genome-related molecules, as well as non-genomic data such as environmental factors and 
epidemiological information, all of which may have a bearing on genomic variation to influence 
disease progression.164 These structures are usually based in a regional or national population, for 
example, the Framingham Heart study is based in Framingham, Massachusetts, and more large-scale 
initiatives have been established, such as the UK Biobank, the National Biobank of Korea,165 the 
Estonia Genome Project and the Icelandic Health Sector Database.166 However, as it will be discussed 
below under global consortia, efforts are being to globalise these databases and biobank-related 
research through networking.  
 Both biobanks and databases are ‘huge infrastructural development[s]’, and necessitate 
‘ongoing governance and management for sample collection, storage and use’.167 As raised by Huzair 
and Papaionnou, regarding the UK Biobank, there is the question of ‘who should invest to support 
pharmaceutical innovation…and serve the public interest.’168 Currently, approximately 60% of 
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sponsors for biobanks are government institutions,169 yet pharmaceutical companies benefit from 
these resources by developing commercial technologies from their related studies. The CAMBIA 
BIOS initiative170 recognises the distinction between the tools for innovation generated by biobanks 
and stored in databases, and the products of innovation, such as the downstream applications of 
diagnostics or therapeutic technologies, often produce by private actors.171 This initiative seeks to 
create an open, networking platform that addresses how IP may be used in open innovation in 
biological sciences, including genomics. This type of networking between public and private actors 
endeavours to alleviate the challenges of the substantial time, investment, research participation and 
expertise that is involved in creating and applying genomic knowledge so as to ‘fully to address all 
of the complexities of the common disease risk’.172 Collaborative initiatives involving biobanks and 
databases, including CAMBIA BIOS,173 are explored in Chapter Four to assess how their IP policies 
and structure contribute to open innovation in genomic medicine. 
 
III. Conclusion 
WHO states that ‘in the long–term, [information generated by genomics will] have major benefits for 
the prevention, diagnosis and management of many diseases which hitherto have been difficult or 
impossible to control.’174 It is for this reason that special attention should be given to the progress and 
development of genomics, which includes innovation in genomic medicine and access to its 
technologies.  
 Genomic medicine requires the genomic profile of an individual in order to inform medical 
decisions. This profiling requires genomic testing, but a profile alone cannot aid in directing medical 
decisions if the significance of genomic variants in disease progression is not understood. Thus, an 
understanding the complexity of the human genome is critical. The development of genetic 
technologies used to understand human genes is not a new endeavour, however the human genome, 
in all its complexity, poses a more complicated, and possibly more expensive challenge. A projection 
of the costs of sequencing an individual genome shows that there has been a dramatic decline in the 
cost, starting at roughly $100 million in 2001, to approximately $1000 in 2015.175 This is promising, 
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however if the resulting genomic knowledge is protected by IPRs, further R&D may be expensive —
this is discussed in the next chapter. Furthermore, to fully annotate the human genome and develop 
downstream technologies, significant expertise is needed. Thus, biobanks and genomic databases as 
components of larger networking initiatives, could be critical structures in accelerating research, 
whilst addressing these issues of cost and capacity.  
 It is for this reason that a better model that facilitates access to research tools for innovation 
in downstream applications should be developed and employed. Intellectual property will have a role 
in this model, which should allow for both open collaboration and maintaining a sustainable industry. 
Thus it is important to answer the questions of who should own such genomic knowledge, and how 
can IPRs be used to facilitate R&D in genomic medicine for further innovation. These questions will 
be discussed in the following chapters on: a) IPRs pertaining to genomic knowledge; and, b) the open 























Chapter Three: understanding the current IP landscape in genomic medicine 
 
‘Light bulb moments’ are synonymous with an ingenious, innovative idea. However, innovation is 
not just a moment; it is a process of many stages. A simplified innovative process begins with an idea, 
discovery or emergence of new knowledge. These are then used in the design of new technologies, 
which may occur by tying in old knowledge or inventions, by experimental trial-and-error, or both. 
Following the invention of the new technology, the technology has to be marketed and 
commercialised so as to create a consumer market, satisfy this market, and, regarding profit-driven 
entities, generate a profit. If the technologies are health-related, there may be an additional, regulatory 
step prior to commercialisation. This multi-step process can be laborious and expensive depending 
on how many steps an entity controls.  
 In traditional closed innovation, an entity will control the entire process, incurring significant 
costs. IPRs then play an important role in securing financial gains for the inventors by limiting the 
amount of competitors in the market. In this way, securing markets captures value for the inventors 
from the invention. Thus, an important aspect of closed innovation is the protection and management 
of IP. However, there has been a shift in the innovation models of certain industries, particularly in 
the biotechnology and software industries.176 Escalating costs and burden of resources, which will be 
discussed further in Chapter Four, are compelling actors in certain industries to limit their activities 
to fewer steps in the innovation chain.177 This division of the innovation chain falls under the model 
of open collaborative innovation, which will be explored in the next chapter. However, this shift does 
not make IPRs obsolete. In fact, IPRs now adopt an additional role to being an incentive to invent 
and reward — the role of being an incentive to network with another entity to gain external knowledge 
for one’s own innovation chain. 
 However, especially in the health-related industries of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, 
IPRs, especially in the form of patents, have received criticism for two broad effects: blocking further 
innovation, and hampering consumer access through trade barriers.178 The latter will not be discussed 
herein, as this would require discussion that is too extensive for this dissertation. Instead, the impact 
of IPRs on innovation will be explored. Through this exploration it will be ascertained how the current 
IP regime, which has been used to support a closed innovation model, could hinder scientists in 
accessing upstream technologies for further innovation and so reduce both the scientific progress for 
public benefit and potential economic gains of the related private sector. The discussion will focus 
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on patents as these are the main form of IPRs used by biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. 
It will be assessed whether patents on parts of the genome (such as gene sequences and non-coding 
DNA) should be allowed under international and national patent law, considering the value of this 
knowledge as research tools and the nature of this knowledge as a public good. Using this assessment, 
the amendment of patent law and how these amendments may facilitate open innovation between the 
public and private sectors will be recommended.   
.  
I. A brief understanding of patents  
Intellectual property refers to ‘creations of the mind: inventions; literary and artistic works; and 
symbols, names and images used in commerce’.179 Intellectual property rights, in the form of patents, 
copyrights and trademarks, are rights to ownership of intellectual property, and are enshrined by 
Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights which states that: 
 
‘Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author’.180 
 
 Patents are government-granted privileges that provide exclusive rights to the patent holder 
to make, use, sell and trade in the patented invention within a particular jurisdiction,181 usually for a 
term of 20 years.182 An invention, as stipulated by Article of 27(1) of TRIPS, is that which is: a) novel 
(it does not exist in prior art, which is the body of existing knowledge); b) non-obvious (or inventive, 
as termed some jurisdictions), meaning that it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art to create the 
invention from prior art; and c), useful or capable of industrial application.183 Patents may apply to 
products, processes of manufacture or uses of an invention.184 
 Patents operate under a quid pro quo system — they seek to reward the inventor through 
exclusive rights that will enable him to recoup the costs of inventing, but also for the obligatory 
disclosure of his invention to the public in a sufficiently detailed manner so as to enable a person 
skilled in the art to replicate in the invention.185 With this knowledge, others may apply for a licence 
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to use the invention within the patent term, ‘invent around’ the claims of the patent, or choose to use 
it once the patent has lapsed.186 Thus, this information may be used in further innovation that makes 
a greater range of technologies available for public consumption, and in doing so, may significantly 
boost economic activity.187 As set out in Article 7 of TRIPS to be discussed below, the objectives of 
IP protection are as follows: 
 
‘promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations.’188 
 
 This disclosure through patents is juxtaposed to trade secrets, which are based in private law, 
where information of an invention is not publically disclosed, preventing the public from using this 
information in further innovation until the trade secret is shared either through private contract or 
unauthorised disclosure.189 In this scenario, information may remain undisclosed for an indefinite 
period of time, which would not support further innovation. Contrary to this, patents attempt to 
balance the social cost of exclusion to use an invention with the social benefit to information about 
the invention for further use and innovation. However, contention arises as to whether patent law 
does actually achieve this balance, and whether patents do not in fact ‘deter’ innovation.190 This 
debate, particularly in the context of genomic medicine, will be explored in the following sections. 
 
II. The impact of patents on genomic medicine: a focus on genomic knowledge 
The impact of patents on access to technologies by researchers and consumers has been widely 
debated over the past decades, especially after the rise of human-rights based litigation challenging 
pharmaceutical patents.191 Whilst patents have an economic justification as a reward for the labour 
and costs incurred by inventors, these also have the potential to create monopolies that prevent access 
to patented technologies, stifling further innovation along the innovation chain. 
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 On the note of research, genomic technologies are heavily reliant on upstream research tools, 
such as DNA sequences, for their R&D. This was illustrated in the examples of DNA microarrays 
and pharmacogenomics in Chapter Two. As critical research tools, the privatisation of these 
sequences through patents may result in their underuse, a phenomenon described as the ‘tragedy of 
the anti-commons’ by Eisenberg and Heller.192 Furthermore, DNA sequences form part of a critical 
facet of genomic knowledge, which some argue is a public good that should not be privatised.193 The 
effect of patents on genomic medicine innovation will be discussed in light of these two arguments. 
 
 (a) Genomic knowledge as a public good 
As proposed by Clark and Turner, ‘knowledge is at the heart of innovation’.194 This is exemplified 
by the biotechnology industry, which is a knowledge-based industry where knowledge is derived 
from research and developed into applications.195 Both the knowledge and the applications capture 
not only social value from use in health systems, but also financial value from IP protection and 
consumer markets (where for-profit entities are concerned). In genomic medicine, the foundational 
knowledge is that of genomic variants and their role in disease progression. Such knowledge, as 
research tools, has allowed for a plethora of downstream applications in diagnostics and therapeutics 
to emerge, justifying the above statement by Clark and Turner.  However, knowledge is also regarded 
as the archetypal public good,196 and the human genome may be regarded as our ‘common human 
heritage’.197 As such, genomic knowledge regarding the genome sequences may be considered as a 
public good, which should benefit the public and not be privatised — this will be explored below. 
 The nature of goods as public or private has been defined by politics and economics. In a 
political sense, public goods are defined as ‘interests or goods which are associated with a multiplicity 
of people or communities’.198 Though this dissertation focuses more on the economic ramifications 
of IP on genomic medicine innovation, this political definition cannot be discarded as genomics 
relates to it in two ways: a) research projects like the Human Genome Project require several groups 
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of participants from different communities in order for the research to be translated into effective and 
viable applications that address multiple interests groups, for example, analysing the variations in the 
genome across ethnicities could highlight which ethnic groups are more susceptible to onset of certain 
diseases; and b), in such public initiatives, the involved scientists and related personnel may come 
from many different national background and sectors. Therefore, groups have argued that the human 
genome (as genomic knowledge) is a public good, and because it is shared amongst people and 
inherited through generations, is also part of the ‘common human heritage’.199 The Human Genome 
Organisation (HUGO) Ethics Committee Statement on Human Genomic Databases is one such 
proponent, taking the view that such databases are ‘global public goods’, and so should be treated as 
public resources to promote the access and flow of information.200 It is for this reason that these 
groups argue against patenting the parts of the human genome, such as DNA sequences. This is a 
strong argument, but fails to evaluate genomic knowledge as a tool in the innovation process. 
Certainly the sentiment of a ‘common human heritage’ calls for unhindered access to genomic 
knowledge, but this fails to address how innovation can be derived from genomic knowledge sans the 
traditional incentive of IPRs. Thus, the economic definition of private and public goods must be 
applied to genomic knowledge to evaluate to what extent this knowledge should reside in the public 
domain or be privatised.  
 From an economics perspective, public goods are non-excludable, meaning that no person can 
be ‘effectively excluded from using the good’.201 Public goods are also non-rivalrous, meaning that 
the use of the good by one person does not reduce the availability of the good for use by another.202 
Knowledge is considered the archetypal public good,203 but this stance is evolving as throughout the 
decades, knowledge, and not merely the applications deriving from knowledge, have been subjected 
to privatisation by patents, making such knowledge excludable. Indeed, holding knowledge as a trade 
secret excludes others from using it, and so knowledge may not actually be a pure public good. In 
this case, where a good is excludable and non-rivalrous, it is considered as a ‘club good’.204  
 Biobanks and genomic databases, specifically those associated with consortia, as mentioned 
in Chapter Two, govern common pool resources, that is, samples are rivalrous (they can be depleted 
or be made unavailable through use), but are intended to be non-excludable (available to all 
researchers, often pending research approval). However the knowledge that is generated, which 
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includes genomic knowledge, is non-rivalrous and does not necessarily have to be excludable.205 In 
many cases, public (or semi-public) biobanks and databases endeavour to protect the non-
excludability of knowledge, that is, the knowledge generated from research on the samples is kept in 
the public domain for others to access.206 This is mainly because samples from which this knowledge 
is obtained are donated by the public, and so the public interest to access this knowledge and avail it 
for future beneficial innovation is considered.  
 However, generating knowledge, especially in risky and high-technology fields such as 
genomics, is expensive, and so it is unrealistic to assume that continued production of genomic 
knowledge will continue without a means to guarantee a profit. Public initiatives and government 
intervention shoulder these costs to keep the knowledge in the public domain to satisfy all interests 
to access and demand, but looking at the cost of the Human Genome Project, listed in chapter two, it 
may be unwise to rely on these for the future of genomic research. This does not necessarily mean 
that privatisation of genomic knowledge is the solution, as will be discussed further on, although the 
private sector may have access to greater resources for the generation of genomic knowledge. Thus, 
what may be needed are collaborations between the private and public sectors where genomic 
knowledge is generated in the public domain and used to develop technologies for privatisation. As 
biobanks and related consortia already face the dilemma of whether the privatisation of the 
downstream technologies, derived from public participation should be condoned,207 what is needed 
are clear IP policies on genomic knowledge, downstream innovation and collaboration. However, as 
policy is informed by law, patent law, which will be discussed below, is critical in determining 
whether genomic knowledge remains in the public domain, and how it is used as research tools if it 
is privatised. The impact of patents on genomic knowledge as a research tool will be discussed below. 
 
 (b) The tragedy of the anti-commons: the underuse of genomic knowledge as research tools 
As drawn from the Ligand Pharmaceuticals v. La Jolla Research case,208 research tools have 
significant impacts on basic research activities and on commercial treatment discovery. Science 
innovation is a cumulative process where inventions or knowledge are constantly improved or used 
to create new inventions.209 For this to occur, scientists need to be able to access and use the inventions 
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or knowledge generated by others. Premarket, upstream research yields knowledge that can be used 
as research tools in the further development of a technology. Genomic knowledge, such as sequences 
of coding and non-coding DNA regions, is valuable as research tools and a foundation for further 
innovation in genomic medicine, for example, gene sequences can be used in creating DNA 
microarrays for genome testing as discussed in Chapter Two. 
 Biomedical research, which includes pharmaceutical and biotechnology research, has 
traditionally existed in the public sector,210 with universities as prolific hubs of research. Governments 
frequently funded such research, especially at universities, and the results were placed in the public 
domain through publication.211 However, in recent years, the promise of such research to yield 
profitable products has been recognised, and a shift has occurred in universities to patent the products 
of their research and not only to publish their results. Some countries even have legislation that 
supports this, such as the Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act (commonly referred to as the 
Bayh-Doyle Act)212 in the US and the Intellectual Property Rights Act in South Africa,213 possibly to 
encourage accelerated growth of sectors — these will be examined below. This shift towards 
privatising knowledge that may otherwise have existed in the public domain potentially reduces the 
access and use of important upstream resources — a phenomenon called ‘the tragedy of the anti-
commons’.214   
 In their article, Eisenberg and Heller propose the ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’ in biomedical 
research.215 The tragedy of the anti-commons derives from the contrasting proposition of the ‘tragedy 
of the commons’. The latter was a theory proposed by ecologist Garrett Hardin which states that 
people overuse resources they commonly own to satisfy their self–interests, which results in the 
depletion of the resource, contrary to the common of all users,216 for example, communal land may 
be farmed excessively. This occurs because there are no private rights to protect how the resource is 
used, and is analogous to tangible goods, such as biological samples, placed in the public domain.217 
Thus, to protect common resources from overuse and exploitation, private rights to these resources 
were granted in hopes of conserving these resources. Knowledge has been included as a resource that 
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requires protection, but as it will be substantiated further on, knowledge cannot be depleted as it is 
used, nullifying the justification that knowledge should be privatised to conserve it. 
 The tragedy of the anti-commons posits that at present resources have been privatised too 
extensively, preventing access to these resources, and effectively underusing them. This is not limited 
to the patenting activities of universities, but these entities are prolific hubs of premarket, upstream 
scientific research, and are usually publically-funded. This proposed tragedy underlies the rationale 
for the Bermuda Principles218 signed by the Human Genome Project consortia to place primary gene 
sequences in the public domain, discussed in chapter two. In this way, the consortia sought to 
maximise the use of this basic scientific resource, and so was jolted by Celera’s threat to privatise 
their own corresponding genomic research.219  
 In biomedical science, including biotechnology, Eisenberg and Heller propose that extensive 
patenting leads to ‘patent thickets’, that is, when many patents are held for a particular technology.220 
In order to access this technology for use in R&D or in a clinical setting, the potential user would 
have to gain licenses for a number of patents, or risk infringements.221 This may be a time-consuming 
and expensive task, and may deter R&D and use of the invention. Furthermore, where there is 
fragmentation of patents, that is, each of the many patents on a technology are held by multiple 
holders, license negotiations may be more arduous and costly, and there is no guarantee that every 
patent holder will agree to licensing out their patent.  
 In the context of biotechnology, the tragedy of the anti-commons can be discussed in terms 
of concurrent fragments and stacking licenses. Concurrent fragments of IPRs refers to when multiple 
patents required for a technology are held by many different patent holders, requiring extensive 
licensing agreements to avoid infringement. Eisenberg and Heller propose that as more patents exist 
for a technology, the risk of infringement increases, and it is more likely to deter potential 
innovation.222 This is of particular interest in genomic diagnostic and therapeutic technologies, whose 
R&D require multiple gene sequences to be used simultaneously. Using the example of genomic 
microarray technology for diabetes, if a microarray for this multifactorial disease was to be 
developed, many genes of the genome, and possibly non-coding regions, would be required to 
develop the technology. If each of these genes and non-coding regions are patented, a developer 
would have to negotiate multiple licenses before being able to develop the microarray technology.223 
This may be a formidable task in terms of time and costs, and could deter the envisioned innovation. 
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Additionally, depending on the contract of the licenses, selling and use of the microarray technology 
may be subject to additional royalty payments, as it will be discussed below under stacked licenses. 
 A particular incident highlights the challenge of concurrent fragments in genomic 
technologies. In 1991, the (National Institutes of Health) NIH filed patents for expressed sequence 
tags (ESTs), which are gene fragments that signal how genes are expressed, and are used in genomics 
to identify genes and families of genes, and map these.224 Unlike with the case of Myriad Genetics 
discussed below,225 the outcry was not necessarily that gene sequences were being patented, but that 
the function of these ESTs were largely unknown.226 As ESTs were correctly thought to be powerful 
research tools in genome analysis, patenting these ESTs potentially had the effect of hindering 
efficient genomic research as in many cases ESTs were not yet corresponded to their particular genes, 
and even if they were, the patents would prevent further R&D in the absence of licenses. The NIH 
abandoned their attempt to patent these tools, although private firms continued to patent ESTs and 
genes whose function were unknown.227 In the development of genomic technologies for genomic 
medicine, patenting many ESTs and their associated genes could hinder R&D for a particular 
application, for example the microarray for diabetes, as licenses for each of the multiple ESTs and 
related genes may be needed before R&D can ensue.228 This further translates to the use of the 
technology, which will be discussed under stacking licenses. 
 A stacked license is that which goes beyond the patented, licensed research tool to the ensuing 
downstream technologies.229 In many cases, research tools enable the development of valuable 
commercial technologies, but because the research tool may not be directly be incorporated into the 
technology, the patent holder of the research tool does not reap the downstream value his tool helped 
create. An example of this would be in pharmacogenomics, where genomes sequences would be used 
to research a medical treatment, but the actual sequences are not in the medication. In this case, patent 
holders of the sequences will only receive a once-off payment by licensees for use in research, and 
will not reap the commercial benefits of the medical treatment. A stacked license is a creative attempt 
to transfer some of these benefits of patent holders of upstream technologies. An example of a stacked 
license is a reach-through licensing agreement (RTLA).230 An RTLA gives the patent holder rights to 
the downstream technology developed by the licensee.231 These rights may be exclusive or non-
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exclusive licenses to use the technology (to be explained in Chapter Four), and/or royalty rights. 
Where the RTLA stipulates exclusive licensing to the licensor, future innovation or use of the 
technology may be blocked as licensors now have bargaining power over the downstream technology, 
which may fall beyond the scope of their actual patents.232  
 However, RTLAs do provide a potential loophole to pursue otherwise costly research — 
licensors may only ask for a small upfront fee in anticipation of receiving royalties on the downstream 
technology, instead of asking for a larger, once-off payment for the license and receiving no further 
royalties.233 This simplifies the initiation of the R&D by the licensee. Although where a downstream 
technology requires many research tools, and thus incurs multiple RTLAs, this may not be a feasible 
solution, especially if the expected commercial value is low, as may be the case in stratified markets. 
In this case, royalties must be paid to many licensors, and is termed ‘royalty stacking’.234 Cetus 
Corporation attempted to stack royalties on all products developed from their licensed technology 
called polymerase chain reaction, an integral technology in genome analysis, but was met with 
resistance.235  
 A particular challenge arises in negotiating licenses in genomic technologies due to the nature 
of the upstream research tools and technologies. Genes and non-coding regions of the genome, which 
are critical components of the research into and hardware of diagnostic and therapeutic technologies 
of genomic medicine, are non-substitutable. This exponentially increases the bargaining power of 
patent holders, who may hold out on licensing until satisfactory terms and conditions are applied. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to successfully ‘invent around’ DNA sequences, especially if the patent 
claims are broad.236 Using the example of the human erythropoietin protein in the case of Amgen, Inc 
v Chugai Pharm Co,237 the claims to the erythropoietin protein (traded as EPOGEN) were broad, as 
it covered any ‘purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a DNA sequence 
encoding human erythropoietin’, which would include chemically synthesised DNA and naturally-
occurring DNA. These were found by the court to be valid and infringed by Chugai Pharm Co, forcing 
competitors to ‘invent around’ the product claims, for example the private company Hoffman–La 
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Roche chemically altered its erythropoietin protein by conjugating it to another compound.238 
However, as Roche still uses the DNA sequence in producing the erythropoietin protein prior to 
conjugation, Amgen sued the company,239 and Roche was ordered by the district court not to import 
its product to the US.240 As mentioned in the above section, infringement may be avoided by public 
sector researchers using research or experimental exemption, although this is not always clear. 
Additionally, if a technology resulting from such research were to be commercialised, and if it is clear 
that patented technology was used, inventors run this risk of infringement, as will be discussed under 
the Myriad case.241  
 These examples illustrate the tragedy of the anti–commons, but Heller and Eisenberg do 
concede that privatisation through IPRs may fortify the incentive to undertake risky and high–
investment research, and could allow for the distribution of profits more equitably as the rights clearly 
delineate who is to reap according to what he has sown.242 Furthermore, there are means to circumvent 
the challenges of multiple negotiations. Developers have the option of employing experienced and 
knowledgeable lawyers to expedite the negotiation process, however, this is only feasible if the 
developers have the financial means to do so. Compulsory licenses, whereby the government instructs 
that the patent–holders to grant the developers the right to use the patented technology, may also be 
used.243 The debate on the effectiveness of compulsory licensing is extensive, and will not be 
discussed here, but what is noteworthy is that it is a measure to be used only after negotiations with 
the patent owner have failed, 244 and it is relatively rarely used, so it may not be an effective 
solution.245  
 Moreover, there is the argument that there is little evidence that the anti–commons is 
prevalence problem that will persist in biomedical sciences. Whilst Gold observes that in the 
pharmaceutical industry, there are fewer new medications produced each year, which he attributes to 
heightened patenting,246 in Kaplan’s review of studies on the anti–commons effect, he finds there is 
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little conclusive evidence on the existence of this tragedy in the biomedical sciences.247 Heller and 
Eisenberg note that private arrangements have been created to reduce the potential obstacles of 
multiple, overlapping IPRs, and such arrangements include bundling of licenses, clearinghouses and 
patent pools, as well as practicing non–exclusive licensing, all of which are discussed further on.248 
As these become more established in the industry, negotiating licenses may become simpler, enabling 
wider use of the patented resource. The feasibility of such arrangements will be explored further in 
ensuing sections. 
(i) Merck and the SNP Consortium: the private sector’s attempts to counter the anti-
commons 
As mentioned above, IPRs owners may devise an arrangement to alleviate the obstacles of 
privatisation. And so, although private actors are often accused of placing profit before public interest, 
contributing to the perceived anti-commons at the expense of further innovation, this is not always 
the case, as demonstrated by the following actions of private actors. One such action, important event 
in the timeline of genomics development, is that of the Merck Gene Index. In 1994, Merck, a private 
pharmaceutical company, together with the Gene Sequencing Center at Washington University, 
initiated a project to identify gene sequences and place these in the public domain.249 Four years later, 
over 800 000 gene sequences had been released into the public domain where any interested 
researcher could access the data.250 This move was not purely philanthropic, although it did enable 
open access to the data.251 By building this database in the public domain, Merck effectively 
prevented other entities from privatising the same knowledge, meaning that Merck would not have to 
enter into license negotiations as a licensee and incur license and transaction costs.252  
 The success of this pre-emption in bolstering genomic research prompted further initiatives, 
such as the SNP consortium, where eleven pharmaceutical companies and the Wellcome Trust 
collaborated to share data on research into genome variations called single nucleotide polymorphisms 
(SNP) and disease associations.253 Though the data was placed in the public domain, the consortium 
initially filed patents to protect data that was at high risk of being patented by other entities. These 
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patents were then abandoned once the consortium placed the data in the public domain. This is a good 
example of IP strategy used to protect genomic knowledge.254  
 These two examples illustrate  how valuable genomic knowledge is for commercial prospects 
— companies are willing to forgo IPRs and enter into collaborations to protect their interests to 
innovation down the line, and so openness is not only a model for public actors to share their scientific 
endeavours and avail it to the public for use. These collaborative efforts between private and public 
entities could be regarded as a foundation for openness in the genomics world, and more recent 
initiatives will be explored in the following chapter.  
 
(c) IPRs on publically-funded technologies: the private rights granted to genomic knowledge 
generators 
The anti-commons is by no means restricted to the patenting activities of large companies in the 
private sector. Publically-funded entities, such as universities and research institutes, biotechnology 
start-ups and non-profit organisations are prolific generators of genomic knowledge, and as such, may 
contribute to the anti-commons through their own patenting activities. As these entities are often 
driven by state-funding, it is questioned whether the results of their research should not be placed in 
the public domain to be used for the benefit of the public. Two ground-breaking additions to national 
legislature were made regarding this question in the US and SA with the Bayh-Dole Act255 and the 
IPR Act256 respectively. These statutes changed the IP activities of publically-funded entities to 
promote the ownership of inventions by these entities rather than the state. By granting universities, 
small businesses and non-profit organisations rights to their state-funded inventions, these Acts 
endeavour to encourage these entities to transfer their technologies from the laboratory to the market 
through commercialisation, as governments may not have the resources to commercialise all the 
projects they fund.257 In this way, the tragedy of the anti-commons and underusing inventions is 
lessened as inventions are commercialised for utilisation by the public.258 Importantly, the goal of 
such legislation is to promote scientific progress by unifying the policy on government-funded 
inventions. As these two Acts share many similarities, they will be discussed simultaneously below 
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to determine how they may influence the privatisation of genomic knowledge and the collaboration 
between private and public sectors. 
 In the US, two of the objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act are: 
 
‘to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and non-profit organizations, 
including universities; to ensure that inventions made by non-profit organizations and 
small business firms are used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise 
without unduly encumbering future research and discovery’259 (emphasis added) 
 
 Though these objectives are not explicitly stated in the IPR Act, the provisions of the IPR Act 
mirror those of the Bayh-Dole Act that seek to address these objectives.  
 In section 202(c)(3) of the Bayh-Dole Act, the above-mentioned entities are required to patent 
any state-funded invention that they intend to own and commercialise.260 The IPR Act also stipulates 
that IP must be protected from appropriation, although it does not explicitly state that this must be 
done through patenting.261 It is assumed that a patent encourages commercialisation as it secures a 
market for the entity, and it also allows for the dissemination of knowledge through disclosure and 
licensing. Concerning licensing, both Acts stipulate that priority must be given to small businesses,262 
with the IPR Act preferring non-exclusive licensing.263 The Bayh-Dole Act states that the state must 
be granted a non-exclusive, irrevocable, non-transferrable, paid-up license.264 This is mirrored by the 
IPR Act, which stipulates that an irrevocable, royalty-free license must be granted to the state.265 
 Through these licensing provisions, it seems that the objectives of collaboration between the 
two sectors, and free competition and enterprise is being promoted. Furthermore, under the Bayh-
Dole Act, if entities agree to license these inventions, royalties have to be shared with the state, and 
a percentage has to be invested to further scientific R&D, thus attempting to satisfy the second 
objective listed above.266 The IPR Act also calls for a portion of the resulting revenue to be allocated 
for further scientific development.267 However, for these licensing provisions to be effective in 
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transferring technology from the laboratory to market, small businesses must be able to 
commercialise these technologies maximally. The sentiment of collaboration between state-funded 
entities should not rule out the possibility that larger private actors may more effectively achieve the 
objective of utilising the invention. Though the Bayh-Dole Act does not lean towards the involvement 
of larger private entities through its provisions, the IPR Act does recognise that: 
 
‘A private entity or organisation may become an exclusive licensee of intellectual 
property emanating from publicly financed research and development undertaken at an 
institution if such private entity or organisation has the capacity to manage and 
commercialise the intellectual property in a manner that benefits the Republic.’268 
 
 Thus, whilst the Bayh-Dole Act makes collaboration an objective, it is actually the provisions 
of the IPR Act that may allow for more feasible collaborations for the commercialisation of 
technology. Therefore, policy on state-funded inventions should encourage collaboration that 
encompasses a diversity of actors so as to provide an even more regulated approach to openness.  
 As universities, biotechnology start-ups and non-profit organisations are primary contributors 
to the generation of genomic knowledge, it could be assumed that, in the absence of clear patent laws 
regarding DNA sequences and uses in research methods, which will be discussed below, these entities 
may ring-fence valuable knowledge needed for downstream applications by other entities through 
patenting. Whether this has indeed been the case requires further research beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  
 In their study, Huang and Murray find that gene patenting decreases public genetic 
knowledge, an effect that is exacerbated by increasing patent scope, private sector ownership, thickets 
and fragmented patent ownership.269 However, Eisenberg and Heller do acknowledge the potential 
role of privatisation in upstream research, noting that it ‘fortif[ies] incentives to undertake risky 
research projects’.270 Furthermore, Kaplan observes that ‘there is little empirical evidence that an 
anti-commons problem is impeding innovation’.271 These diverging viewpoints on the pervasiveness 
of the anti-commons tragedy suggest that as yet patents can neither be absolved of their posited 
impediment to innovation, nor can they be prohibited on the basis of the anti-commons. Rather, it is 
recommended that more industry- and sector-specific research be conducted regarding the anti-
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commons effect created by the patenting upstream research tools such as genome sequences, which 
will be discussed below. 
 
III. Patenting Genome Sequences 
When Celera announced its intent to patent the genomic sequences it uncovered, the Human Genome 
Project responded by accelerating its efforts so as to win the race and place its reference genome in 
the public domain (as elaborated on in the previous chapter). Since this race, patenting of genes has 
garnered global attention, with a simultaneous rise in litigation against DNA patents, mostly in 
developed countries. Indeed, in the US, there was a motion to pass the Genomic Research and 
Accessibility Act, which would end patenting of genes.272 The number of DNA patents, on full or 
partial sequences, has increased over the years in the countries producing the most biomedical 
innovations. Thus GeneWatch UK noticed an upward trend in gene patenting in the UK.273 However, 
investigators analysing gene patenting in the US should observe a decline in gene patents since the 
judgement of Myriad274 where patents on natural DNA sequences were declared non-patentable (to 
be discussed below). These discrepancies arise from the fact that international and national patent 
laws are either not clear on the subject of DNA patenting, or that they are not aligned. The laws on 
these research tools will affect the IP policies created for open innovation initiatives by consortia 
involving biobanks and genomic databases, as well as downstream developers, and will be explored 
in Chapter Four. Thus, the legal instruments — in particular, TRIPS, and the national or regional 
patent laws of the US, the EU and SA— as well as relevant litigation on DNA patenting and further 
innovation will be examined. Based on this, recommendations on how these laws can be amended so 
as to facilitate IP policies that align with open innovation principles will be made. 
(a) Examining international patent law: the TRIPS agreement 
The examination begins with an international legal instrument, the TRIPS agreement, which binds 
162 member states, and thus has a significant influence on the global landscape of IPRs. The standards 
provisions of patents, relating to patent term and invention criteria, enclosed in TRIPS have been 
outlined in the above section. Though TRIPS seeks to harmonise IP law across states, the language 
of certain provisions allows for flexibility in interpretation. The most pertinent of such provisions to 
this discussion of DNA patenting are those of Article 27. Whilst Articles 27(2) and (3) allows 
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members to exclude certain subject matter from patentability, it is neither specific in its exclusions, 
not are member states obliged to do so. Indeed, methods of diagnosis, therapy and surgery of humans 
may be excluded, but this in itself does not exclude diagnostic or therapeutic genomic technologies.275 
The gene patent debate more likely hinges on the interpretation of Articles 27(1) and (2). Where 
Article 27(1) states that there may be no discrimination in the fields of technology on what is 
patentable,276 two overarching stipulations apply that may be used to challenge patents in genomic 
technologies. Firstly, the invention claimed must fulfil the criteria of inventiveness, novelty and 
industrial application.277 Litigants have challenged human gene patents based on these grounds. 
Secondly, members may exclude inventions from patentability if they are contrary to public policy 
or if the inventions protect human health.278 Considering the global public good nature of genomic 
knowledge, discussed above, it may be seen as contrary to public policy to patent genes as inventions. 
A second argument could be made that it is contrary to public health to patent basic science that is 
critical as a research tool. 
 Article 8, which outlines the principles of TRIPS, grants members the freedom to adopt 
measures that ‘protect public health’, ‘promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to 
their socio-economic and technological development’, and ‘prevent the abuse of intellectual property 
rights by right holders’.279 In light of these freedoms, the national/regional patent law of the US, the 
EU and SA, the choice of which has been justified in Chapter One, will be examined. These laws will 
be explored with reference to the landmark precedent set by the US Myriad case280 that led to a 
revision of United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) guidelines.281 
(b) The role of Myriad in patent office practice 
Myriad Genetics is a US-based molecular diagnostic company that held patents for the breast cancer 
genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2. Under the prior USPTO guidelines, genes were patentable as they were 
regarded as ‘compositions of matter’.282 The company offered testing for the variants of these genes, 
some of which are associated with higher incidences of breast and ovarian cancer in women, but was 
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not the only provider which used these genes in their diagnostic testing. In the ensuing litigation, 
Myriad challenged competing providers in attempts to secure a monopoly over the diagnostic 
service.283 This began with litigation against OncorMed284 and the University of Pennsylvania285 that 
forced both competitors agreed to leave the commercial testing market and created a monopoly over 
the testing for these genes by Myriad. In this instance, the use of the genes in non-commercial research 
was not challenged. The risks of a monopoly are that: a) costs of services or products can be raised; 
b) logistics may hinder patient access; c) the company can deny access to goods; d) there is less 
incentive for a company to improve on the existing technology;286 and, e) all the information about 
the gene variants is controlled by one entity, which is not necessarily unbeneficial if the company has 
interests in maximally developing this information. The threat of these risks led to the landmark case 
Association for Molecular Pathology v Myriad Genetics, Inc287 where a precedent was set regarding 
the patentability of naturally-occurring DNA sequences,288 which led to a revision of the USPTO 
guidelines.289 
 In the above case, the plaintiff, the Association for Molecular Pathology (AMP), challenged 
many claims of the BRCA1/2 patents, including the validity of patenting gene sequences, diagnostic 
methods claims and drug screening claims. Of particular interest to this chapter is the validity of gene 
patents as patentable subject matter, based on §101 of Title 35 of the Unites States Code (regarding 
patent law) which states that: 
 
‘Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.’290 
 
 The plaintiff argued that the patents restricted research for clinicians and limited scientific 
progress, which is at the heart of this discussion. Additionally, the plaintiff argued that the patent 
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made it impossible for patients to receive second opinions, and they were subjected to high costs of 
the testing service. The defendant, Myriad Genetics, countered that the ‘isolated sequences’ were 
analogous to other chemical compounds, which were patentable under the USPTO provided they 
were novel and thus different from sequences found in the body. Myriad argued that the isolation 
procedure sufficiently altered the chemical composition of the isolated sequences. Patent law is the 
US, in line with the guidelines of TRIPS (to be discussed below) excludes laws of nature from patent 
eligibility, and the Supreme Court judges in the Myriad case cited Diamond v Chakrabarty in 
determining whether the isolated genes had ‘markedly different characteristics from any found in 
nature’.291 It was found that merely isolating and purifying the two genes did not markedly alter their 
genetic information, and these patents did not claim for ‘new compositions of matter’, and were thus 
ineligible.292 This led to a revision of the USPTO guidelines, which states that ‘examiners should now 
reject product claims drawn solely to naturally occurring nucleic acids or fragments thereof, whether 
isolated or not’.293  
 Another claim that was challenged by the plaintiffs was the sequences to cDNA 
(complementary DNA) of the above genes. Genes contain regions that are coding and non-coding, 
called exons and introns, respectively.294 The introns do not code for the gene’s functional product 
(such as a protein), but are involved in the regulation of gene expression in the cell. In a laboratory 
setting, these introns are unnecessary and removed to form cDNA — a refined form of the isolated 
DNA.295 As with natural DNA sequences, cDNA is also an important research tool, often used in 
place of naturally-occurring sequences, as introns may be redundant to the research.296 On this matter, 
the judges found that cDNA is ‘not a “product of nature”’, and must be created in a laboratory by 
removing intron sequences, and thus it is patent eligible according to US patent law.297 However, it 
must be pointed out that whilst cDNA is produced by removing intron sequences, this is mirrored by 
machinery in the cell that creates templates of the DNA to be used in making the final product, such 
as a protein.298 These templates are also void of introns sequences, these having been removed by the 
cell machinery. Thus, it is felt that this step is part of existing knowledge and an obvious step, and 
should render cDNA patent ineligible. 
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 Nonetheless, the judgement on naturally-occurring DNA sequences has been celebrated by 
the public and scientific community. A key feature of this case is that the judges recognised that 
patent protection must balance creating incentives for innovation, and should not ‘imped[e] the flow 
of information’ that might lead to innovation.299 Furthermore, they highlighted that Myriad could not 
rely on that fact that it was the practice of the patent office in the past to grant gene patents.300 This 
is a promising stance that invites reconsideration of what may be an outdated system for genomic 
technologies, as it has already been incorporated into the USPTO guidelines. 
(ii) Patenting methods of using research tools: the GTG controversy on non-coding DNA 
Literature on DNA patenting has focussed on gene patenting, and little attention has been placed on 
the patents of non-coding DNA (as explained above, DNA that does not form genes, which code for 
cell processes). Non-coding DNA is also being recognised as a valuable diagnostics research tool in 
genomic medicine as it enables the identification and analysis of genes that may be associated with 
diseases. Recent cases have emerged with a leading firm in non-coding DNA research, Genetic 
Technologies (GTG), and have highlighted the function of non-coding DNA sequences in identifying 
gene sequences.  
 Non-coding sequences and genes are linked, which means that they are inherited together. 
Therefore, to identify a specific genetic variation, one can look for the non-coding region, which is 
often a shorter sequence, rather than looking for the longer gene sequence.301 In many of the GTG 
cases, the company claimed that other pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms were infringing on 
their patented methods of detecting genes using the non-coding DNA, such as in the US case of 
Genetic Technologies Ltd v Merial LLC.302 Here the Federal Court used the two-step test for patent-
eligibility. In the first step they determined whether the disputed claim was directed toward patent-
ineligible subject matter, and found that GTG’s patent was ‘directed toward a law of nature’— that 
is, the linkages between the non-coding and coding regions of DNA was naturally-occurring — which 
is a patent-ineligible concept.303 In the second step, the court assessed whether an inventive concept 
was used that sufficiently transformed the patent-ineligible law of nature into a patent-eligible 
application.  
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 The court found that the steps of ‘amplification and analysis of the amplified [non-coding] 
DNA’ did not constitute an inventive concept, as these steps were ‘well-known, routine and 
conventional’ activity.304 Furthermore, the court found that analysing the non-coding DNA to detect 
the coding region was a mental process, which is regarded as patent-ineligible because ‘computational 
methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind are the types of methods that embody 
the basic tools of scientific and technological work that are free to all men and reserved exclusively 
to none’.305 Thus, the patent was declared invalid under 35 USC s 101,306 setting a precedent for 
methods that use non-coding DNA as a research tool for genomic analysis.307 However, this only 
applied in the US. Other countries have not yet raised the issue of patents on non-coding DNA 
sequences or how these are used, leaving GTG as a chief patent-holder in non-coding DNA 
technology. Additionally, the patenting of the sequences was not been challenged as in Myriad,308 
although it is likely that non-coding DNA will be treated the same as naturally-occurring isolated 
gene sequences. This is because the only difference between these two structures is their function, 
not their chemical structures. Thus, these implications for gene patents would hold for non-coding 
DNA sequence patents as well. 
 GTG, as such a leader in non-coding DNA technology, is in a prime position to expand its 
licensing potential globally. Unlike with the Merck Gene Index,309 GTG seeks to capture value 
through licensing patents to increase their revenue for further projects, even extending licensing to 
academic institutions who stand to benefit commercially from their R&D using non-coding DNA.310 
However, in light of the Genetic Technologies case (and similar litigation), it is questionable whether 
its patents are necessarily valid. If these patents are not valid, GTG’s extensive licensing, costing 
from $75,000 for commercial firms, is an expensive obstacle in the R&D cycle of firms and academic 
institutions.311 Nonetheless, in the absence of legal precedent and clarity in the patent law, GTG is 
primed to expand its licensing program with private and public entities engaged in genomic research. 
Mervyn Jacobson, executive chairman of GTG says that the licenses for academic institutions are a 
flat license arrangement of $1 000, which is minimal, and that GTG tries ‘to be helpful to publicly 
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funded organizations’.312 Future research will determine whether this approach is indeed beneficial, 
or if the GTG extensive licensing program needs more development under an open innovation 
paradigm, assuming GTG will not adopt an open access approach like Merck and that patent law or 
case law will not address the patent-eligibility of non-coding DNA sequences or the methods of gene 
detection in which they are used.313  
(c) Examining the patent law of the EU and South Africa 
The above cases, and those that were used in deciding their judgements, have set precedents in the 
US. However, not all jurisdictions concur with these guidelines, as seen in the EU. Under the EU 
Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, inventions are still eligible to patent 
‘even if the structure of that element is identical to that of a natural element’, such as isolated DNA.314 
As products of nature, these were recognised as ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work’ 
beyond patent protection in Myriad, which were required for future innovation.315 The Directive holds 
the view that private business interests and public health interests should be considered, and 
acknowledges that high-risk investment in the fields related to genomics must be rewarded to 
encourage further investment and industrial development, without creating barriers to trade.316 
Although the Directive does acknowledge the need to protect public health,317 which may be a 
gateway should a situation arise where genome patents threaten the interest of the public in genomic 
healthcare technologies, its current provisions allow genome sequences (natural, isolated or cDNA) 
to be privatised and kept out of the reach of the public domain, which may not favour open access, as 
envisioned by certain open innovation practices. However, open innovation does not rely on open 
access alone, with licensing of IP an integral part of certain practices under this paradigm. Therefore, 
at least with these clear legal guidelines, IP policies that favour open innovation may still be more 
easily developed as opposed to countries that do not have clear guidelines, such as SA.  
 SA is an example of a country that, despite adopting Article 27(1) of TRIPS in its Patents Act 
No. 57 of 1978318 (hereafter the Patents Act), does not apply the subject patentability criteria of 
novelty, inventiveness and utility when granting patents. The European Patent Office, on the other 
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hand, follows Article 3 of the EU Directive which lists these criteria. Unlike in the US, the SA patent 
authority does not issue guidelines that are used to assess patentability, so it could well occur that 
patent claims on naturally-occurring DNA sequences or otherwise may slip under the radar, left to be 
challenged in the courts. Nonetheless, this is not entirely ominous as this deficit of direction leaves a 
space to develop patent law, judicial guidelines or policy that could call for the proper application of 
the invention criteria (as will be discussed in Chapter Four under the national IP policy of SA). It is 
suggested that firstly, SA draws on the judgement of Myriad319 to exclude naturally-occurring DNA 
sequences, isolated or not, and defines what is ‘markedly different’ to nature, and in the process 
reviews the decision made on cDNA. Secondly, SA should employ a search-and-examination system 
where the patent authorities will grant a patent based on the criteria of novelty, inventiveness and 
utility. This will be explored under SA IP policy reform in the next chapter. By implementing these 
measures, SA and other countries that follow suit, may create a healthier IP environment for open 
innovation initiatives. 
 Certainly, when looking at global consortia, such as the SNP Consortium or the Human 
Genome Project, international harmonisation regarding patent law and policy is favourable, 
regardless of the innovation model they employ. TRIPS is in an ideal position to initiate this, given 
the number of signatories, its objective to harmonise patent law, and the fact that its provisions were 
adopted into legislation in several countries. Commentators argue that perhaps the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), free from the trade agenda of TRIPS, is a better platform for issues 
of intellectual property harmonisation.320 An international consensus on patent law and policy would 
ease the task of global consortia in advancing genomic health. However, as already seen by the 
contrasting provisions between the USPTO guidelines and the EU Directive, such a consensus on 
genomic issues, especially DNA patenting, may be challenging. Furthermore, natural genome 
sequences are only one aspect of the genomic research tool arsenal. As highlighted in the Myriad 
judgement, a distinction can be made between man-made and naturally occurring sequences, although 
this is also contentious. Additionally, a lack of IPRs may discourage discovery of these research tools 
in the private sector, placing the task on the public sector, which may lack the necessary resources. 
IP law may need to evolve to encompass these issues before solid IP policies of open initiatives can 
progress smoothly to address public and private interests in innovation.  
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IV. The benefits of patents on the human genome 
In the above sections, the potential of patents on genomic knowledge to hinder scientific progress, 
however this is a one-sided perspective has been explored. Patents may also have a valuable role to 
play in managing the flow of information and optimising the use of knowledge. These benefits will 
be discussed under Burk’s theory of patents as data aggregators, and under the practice of licensing 
in open innovation. 
 Burk theorises that patents on technologies that contribute to genomic knowledge application, 
such as genomic testing technologies, act as data aggregators.321 In his theory, Burk posits that as 
patents can restrict the number of gene/genome testing providers, data resulting from these genetic 
tests will accrue within fewer companies’ databases. Myriad Genetics is a good example of this as by 
monopolising the genetic testing of BRCA1/2, it received all the data on the possible variants and 
associated disease information from its patients. As genomic medicine is tethered to the in-depth 
understanding of these variants, Burk suggests that patents allow for the data to be coordinated at one 
point (in the case of single provider) rather than being dispersed among competitors as incomplete 
pockets of data. Thus, he proposes that the amount and diversity of useful data held by a firm 
decreases as more competitors enter a market, in the absence of licensing agreements and networking, 
leading to reduced innovative output.  
 In a closed innovation model, a patent monopoly favours data aggregation, but limits the R&D 
capabilities of other interested researchers who do not hold the patent rights through licensing. In 
open innovation, the flow of knowledge will require either open access to data or extensive licensing, 
both of which will be discussed in Chapter Four. Patents are integral to licensing, as these are licensed 
out or in, and in this way technology is transferred and a profit may be generated. Currently, licensing 
practices are modelled under a closed innovation approach, but are essential in Chesbrough’s open 
innovation model to be explored in Chapter Four. But patents are not only a passive means of securing 
profits through monopolies or licensing, but are also used as indicators of a firm’s expertise and 
potential.322 This is particularly relevant to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) who may 
proactively use patent portfolios to attract the partnership or investment of large corporations, or may 
establish themselves as prolific innovators from whom large companies can buy the patented 
technologies or agree to licenses.  This is especially the case in cross-licensing,323 where SMEs (or 
any actor) can use their IPRs as a form of leverage. In all these cases, IPRs are used to confer a 
                                                          
321 D L Burk ‘Patents as data aggregators in personalized medicine’ (2015) available at 
https://intranet.law.ox.ac.uk/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Alleles_%20D%20Burkdocx.pdf, accessed 24 April 
2017. 
322 Nicol & Nielsen (note 210 above; 355). 
323 Ibid 355-356. 
57 
 
competitive advantage.324 Furthermore, the evolution of these inter-firm relationships could pave the 
way for more open models of innovation using IPRs and strengthening the pro-IPRs stance largely 
adopted by the private sector of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. The use of IPRs in 
open innovation through licensing will be discussed in the following chapter.  
V.  Conclusion 
Genomic knowledge generates critical R&D tools, such as DNA sequences, for downstream 
innovation in genomic medicine, but this knowledge, despite it being argued that it is a public good, 
may be privatised through IPRs such as patenting. This necessitates licenses for further innovation, 
which may be costly and difficult to negotiate, especially where a patented technology incorporates 
claims to many research tools, or where innovation requires multiple research tools held by different 
patent holders (concurrent fragments). Using the Myriad325 case as precedent, some may argue that 
patents on DNA sequences should be prohibited, and whilst this is sentiment is shared by the author, 
the lack of clarity from TRIPS, and the conflicting views of jurisdictions may not enable a global 
transition to this provision. Furthermore, although these measures will open up these critical research 
tools for further innovation, these will not enable value capture for private interests groups, as these 
research tools alone are merely chips of knowledge that need to be translated into useful, commercial 
medical technologies. What is needed is a governance mechanism that promotes innovation in 
genomic medicine and ‘maintains a balance between the global public goods characteristics of 
genomics knowledge and the private goods nature of its application’.326 This mechanism, facilitated 
by coherent IP law and policy on patenting and licensing in the public and private sectors, needs to 
allow for the ‘continuous circulation of knowledge’ for downstream innovation.327 
 Innovation systems need to be constructed so as to ‘create and distribute benefits from a public 
resource without being captured through patents and private appropriation of value’.328 There should 
be an innovation system that does not rely on patent monopolies and excessive license fees, but in 
doing so, does not minimise the economic profits to potential ‘research partners’ of biobanks and 
public initiatives to that which is unappealing and unsustainable. Thus private actors must be 
incentivised to produce public goods, that are not rendered excludable by IP, or public actors must be 
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supported to undertake risky, high investment ventures.329 One means of doing this would be to 
nationalise IP at market prices, which means that privately–owned IP would be sold to the state and 
the IP would exist under state control and become a public asset. This provides private actors with a 
more dependable source of profit in lieu of profiting off their patents, and allows the state to use the 
IP as a public good to meet the demands of the concerned sectors. The 100 000 Genomes Project, 
which is explored in the following chapter, employs a similar structure where a state–owned company 
largely controls the publically– or privately–generated IP developed from the genomic information it 
holds. 
 This model has economic ramifications that may affect the subsequent willingness of the 
private sector to engage in this type of arrangement where IPRs are traded for a dependable income 
source, however, these ramifications are beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead what this 
arrangement emphasises is the centralisation of IP ownership. As the state concerns itself with 
meeting public demands, it is a prime candidate to act as a governing body over the relevant IP. 
However, the state may not be the only actor capable of coordinating IP through ownership — 
independent, private initiatives also have this capacity, such as with the BIOS initiative to be explored 
in the following chapter. Ideally what such centralisation offers is a control over how knowledge 
flows are created, fostering an environment for partnerships or networks between public and private 
actors that have similar R&D goals but different interests.330 Rischard331 summarises the potential of 
networks below as follows: 
 
‘On our increasingly small and interconnected planet…global problems cannot be solved 
within any one nationstate. They call for collective and collaborative action….The current 
international system is simply not effective enough – or at least fast enough – to solve 
these problems.’332 
 
 Though Rischard is referring to networking between nations, and Dowdeswell et al333 use this 
in support of government-led networks (for legitimacy and accountability), the latter agree that the 
potential of this system could be extrapolated to public-private sectors networks as well (which 
involve international organisations, non-governmental organisations, corporations, and other 
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interested parties), such as BIOS,334 although this requires further substantive evidence. These 
networks require a flow of knowledge and technology, facilitated by a model such as that of open 
innovation. In the following chapter, open innovation in genomic medicine will be explored, and the 
openness of the IP policies of three genomics-related initiatives that involve the public and private 
































Chapter Four: The role of IP policy on open collaborative innovation in genomic medicine 
 
As proposed by Peter Drucker, an eminent management theorist of the 20th century, ‘The corporation 
as we know it is … unlikely to survive the next 25 years. Legally and financially, yes. But not 
structurally and economically’, as the economy becomes based in rapidly evolving knowledge.335 
Companies operating under traditional internally-focussed, closed innovation models — in which 
producers control the entire innovation chain, from discovery to marketing, and act in isolation336 — 
are realising that this business model is becoming obsolete337 as it struggles to produce and use 
knowledge at sufficient pace, leading to declining R&D productivity and competitive advantage.338 
This has led to the concept of ‘openness’ in innovation, which relies on strategic alliances based on 
strengths, and models where knowledge can rapidly flow to enhance productivity and 
commercialisation of innovation. In this chapter, the concept of open innovation, focussing on open 
collaborative innovation as framed in Chapter One will be discussed. This will be followed by a 
discussion on the shift from closed to open innovation models in genomic medicine, drawing on the 
arguments made in Chapter Three to highlight the role of IPRs in this shift. In the next section, the 
various IP policies of collaborative initiatives, as substantiated in Chapter One, will be consolidated 
into a comprehensive IP policy that promotes open innovation. The Draft Intellectual Property Policy 
of SA Phase 1 (2017)339 and the SA Medical Research Council’s (MRC) IP policy340 will be examined 
in juxtaposition to the consolidated IP policy on open collaborative innovation.  
 
I.  The principles of open innovation in genomic medicine 
(a) The foundation of open innovation: purposive knowledge flows 
Science has traditionally been associated with the ‘ideal of free and open dissemination of scientific 
knowledge’ that enables cumulative innovation by producers and users of inventions.341 However, as 
industries emerged and grew, the interest arose to capture value from scientific pursuits for future 
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innovation and to satisfy investments. As knowledge was recognised as the heart of innovation and 
competitiveness,342 and a firm’s competitive advantage stemmed from its ‘unique knowledge and 
how it manage[d] that knowledge’343 industries sought to control knowledge and resources in the 
innovation chain, from discovery to commercialisation to avoid incurring external costs for resources 
and skills, and to secure monopolies and fees from licensing.344 This control required the boundaries 
of the firm (or other profit–seeking entities) to be closed and impermeable; knowledge and innovation 
was kept within the firm, and was sourced in as this would require the firm to enter costly licensing 
agreements, whose upfront payments or royalties would reduce the profit margins of the firm.345 
Especially in the past few decades, IPRs, as discussed in Chapter Three, have dominated the 
innovation landscape as means of creating competitive advantage and capturing value through closing 
the boundaries of an entity,346 and IP policies based on patent and contract law have been integral in 
the business model of profit-seeking entities, as well as the models of public-based organisations that 
seek to capture social value of healthcare, such as medical research councils or national biobanks, or 
initiatives, such as the Human Genome Project. Additionally, IPRs are not only a passive means of 
securing profits through monopolies or licensing, but are also used as indicators of a firm’s expertise 
and potential.347 This is particularly relevant to SMEs who may proactively use patent portfolios to 
attract the partnership or investment of large corporations, or may establish themselves as prolific 
innovators from whom large companies can buy the patented technologies or agree to licenses. 
 However, arguments have been raised that enclosing scientific knowledge is contrary to the 
communalism ideal of science mentioned above,348 and that a new model of innovation is needed that 
balances the ideals of science with the private interests of participants. This model should allow for 
the dissemination of knowledge and technology, aligned with the principles of international 
instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights349 or the TRIPS Agreement,350 to be 
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used for further scientific pursuit. For knowledge to flow optimally, the boundaries of entities have 
to be permeable, leading to the model of open innovation. Before the potential of this model is 
explored, open innovation has to be defined within the context of this dissertation. In Chapter One, 
the open innovation model that will be explored has been outlined, and will be elaborated on in this 
section.   
 The concept of open innovation is based on the principle that knowledge relevant for 
innovation is abundantly dispersed outside the firm, and external knowledge can be used to improve 
internal innovation.351 A strong public knowledge base is highlighted as a factor promulgating the 
shift to open innovation,352 as the abundance of external knowledge that will be available to 
competitors is extensive. Knowledge–based economies are suited to open innovation and the nature 
of knowledge itself supports openness — whereas physical goods are protected from overuse by 
privatisation, as discussed under the tragedy of the commons, knowledge is intangible and non–rival, 
that is, it can be reused and applied to generate increasing returns without being diminished.353  In 
this way, knowledge can flow easily between entities and be used without creating obstacles of access 
for each entity. For example, two diagnostics firms may use the same gene information to 
independently develop diagnostic technologies, and the knowledge will still be available for further 
use. This is juxtaposed to a scenario where two soft drink companies have to compete for an 
exhaustible supply of water. This concept of purposive in–flows and out–flows of knowledge is based 
on the work of Henry Chesbrough, as discussed in Chapter One. Chesbrough delineates open 
innovation as being inbound or outbound, with knowledge being internalised from external parties, 
or outsourced to external parties, respectively.354 Synonymous phrases used to describe such flow of 
knowledge include outside–in and inside–out, respectively.355 In the following sub–section, the 
means by which knowledge flow is created in the firm–centric open innovation model envisioned by 
Chesbrough will be described, and further on the evolution of this model beyond the firm to a more 
collaborative approach between a variety of actors will be explained. 
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(i) Inbound and outbound licensing  
Licensing is a means of creating knowledge flow, and knowledge may be licensed in from an external 
source, or licensed out. Generally, IP is licensed out by a licensor to a licensee for a fee, although in 
a cross–license, each party acts as a licensor and a licensee, trading in IP licenses. Licensing incurs 
transactions costs, and high upfront fees or royalties, which may be prohibitive to the practice. The 
OECD addresses best licensing practices in its Guidelines for the Licensing of Genetic Inventions 
(Guidelines)356 (to be discussed below under the section on the consolidated policy framework). 
There are three types of licenses, each dictating the number of potential licensees and third party 
involvement: exclusive, semi–exclusive and non–exclusive. In an exclusive licence agreement, the 
licensee has exclusive rights to use the licensed technology and the associated IPRs, and the licensor 
itself does not retain these and must refrain from granting licences to third parties.357 The semi-
exclusive licence agreement assigns the same rights to the licensee as the exclusive license, however 
the licensor may retain the right to exploit the technology, although it may not license out to third 
parties.358 In a non-exclusive licence agreement, the licensee and licensor are assigned the same rights 
as in the semi–exclusive license, but the licensor retains the right to grant other licences to third 
parties.359 
 The benefits of licensing in knowledge is that it reduces the amount of human and financial 
capital required by a single firm to generate the same knowledge, and diminishes duplication and 
risks of failure.360 Moreover, it may provide new directions to the existing knowledge base. Licensing 
out is also beneficial to a firm, especially in light of knowledge spill–overs, that is, knowledge that is 
generated by the firm but is not directly useful for its core purposes but can be used by others.361 
These knowledge spill–overs contribute to external knowledge, and are useful as leverage in the open 
innovation model, where one party trades their knowledge for that of another.362 Licensing out 
provides financial revenue, and in some cases, builds a reputation for the firm. An evolution of 
licensing practice to cross–licensing, may reduce transaction costs, upfront payments and royalties, 
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but this is only feasible if both parties have equally valuable licenses, which is not necessarily easy 
to evaluate objectively.363  
 Licenses do not have to be for patented technology. In fact, an OECD report states that ‘in 
several countries most licences are for non-patented intellectual property, such as biological research 
material or copyrighted works’.364 However, as the focus on this dissertation on the role of IPRs, 
particularly patents, in open innovation, licensing will henceforth concern patented knowledge and 
technologies, unless otherwise stated.  
 To maximise the diffusion of knowledge, licensing may follow FRAND licensing policy.365 
FRAND policy requires that licensing is fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory.366 However, the 
challenge is determining what constitutes the FRAND principles. Often, these terms are defined by 
standard bodies that oversee licensing in a particular technology. Genomic medicine does not seem 
to have such bodies, without which the articulation of FRAND policy is difficult to achieve. Policies 
regarding IP that intend to favour open innovation, or any licensing practice, should address both the 
issue of FRAND definitions and oversight standard bodies. The three following examples of licensing 
in genomic diagnostics illustrates this challenge. Firstly, genes patented by research institutions can 
be freely accessed for diagnostic testing, but royalties must be paid when the genes are used in 
commercial tests, and these payments should not be prohibitive.367 Secondly, firms may also choose 
to license out their patents on diagnostic testing on condition that competitors mark their cost-price 
higher than the patent holder. This, however, may not benefit consumers if the patent holder chooses 
to set this baseline cost quite high. A third strategy, as employed by Myriad regarding the BRCA 
genes, is that licenses may be granted for a subset of the gene mutations, with the patent holder 
retaining the rights to test for the entire set of genetic mutations. Again, patient access to services is 
impeded by this model of commercialisation, and as seen from these examples. What is needed is a 
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(b) The evolution of open innovation through democratisation and collaboration 
The open innovation model proposed by Chesbrough is a firm-centric paradigm where firms form 
strategic alliances to barter knowledge, but this knowledge remains within a closed circuit of the few 
networked parties. 368 Over the years, others have developed the model to extend beyond the firm, 
retaining the principle of knowledge flows between actors, claiming that certain knowledge  such as 
research tools, must not just flow in a closed circuit, as in Chesbrough’s firm-centric model as this 
may impede cumulative innovation.369  For example, knowledge on genomic sequences should be 
available as widely as possible, with the option of improving on the knowledge base through 
annotation, and re–entering this modified knowledge into a commons. As mentioned in Chapter One, 
of particular note is the open distributed innovation model proposed by Von Hippel — which 
incorporates the public good nature of genomic knowledge —370 and Gassman and Enkel’s interactive 
coupled innovation model,371 which builds on Chesbrough’s model. In the latter model, inside–out 
and outside–in processes are combined in strategic networks of complementary partners, which 
distributes the innovation process as suggested by Von Hippel.372  
 This distributed innovation, also known as democratised innovation,373 is where knowledge 
is disseminated (through means discussed below) through society so that the tasks of innovation are 
shared by partners. 374  These partners may include other firms, non-profit organisations, universities, 
and individuals (such as users and inventors)375 which may differ in what they produce and how they 
commercialise their innovations, that is, these entities may have different innovation strengths and 
approaches to disseminating innovation.376 For example, universities are rich sources of basic 
research;377 core biotechnology firms are rich sources of complementary knowledge, creativity and 
entrepreneurship; 378  and large companies offer ‘management organisation and technology’. 379 These 
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principles of purposeful, reciprocal and strategic flows of knowledge between parties aims ‘for the 
benefit of all by coordinating activities and communicating information within an environment of 
trust and transparency’, leading to an overall model of open collaboration.380 In such a model, the 
locus of innovation shifts from being within each organisation to being jointly created outside the 
collaborating organisations.381  
 The open collaborative model explored here is based on the flow of public and privatised 
knowledge between the private and public actors. UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human 
Genome & Human Rights382 states that scientific benefits should be shared,383 calling for the 
exchange of scientific knowledge and information between cooperating organisations and states.384 
As discussed in the previous chapter, whilst knowledge is regarded as the archetypal public good, 
knowledge as IP can be protected. Thus, as highlighted in Chapter Three, the crux is the balance 
between keeping knowledge in the public domain and privatising it so as to maximise its distribution 
for further innovation. The UK MRC’s Data Sharing Policy385 encapsulates this duality in both its 
mandate on commercialisation and public–private collaboration, and the view that publically–funded 
research data is a public good, to which access should be as unrestricted as possible.386 Placing 
knowledge in the public domain does have the potential to optimise its diffusion for further scientific 
innovation as the knowledge is freely accessible. However, as explored in the previous chapter, 
privatising knowledge attracts commercialisation that also allows for diffusion of innovation in the 
interests of the consumer. In the sub–sections below, the various models of open innovation that can 
be incorporated into open collaborative innovation will be described. 
 At this juncture it is important to emphasise that open collaboration here does not necessarily 
mean parties have a common research or development goal – some, such as the SNP Consortium or 
the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) vaccine pool, may concentrate on a particular disease 
or task, but others may simply have an overall goal to promote information flow to enable the goals 
of individual parties.  Moreover, open collaboration is not necessarily synonymous with altruism or 
free–for–all access without IP protection. 387 ‘Open’ in this context does not stipulate ‘free’ in terms 
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of access or cost. As  Cohen and Walsh state, ‘any positive price for access to intellectual property 
potentially restricts access’,388 however, if the price is reasonable and non–discriminatory, analogous 
to the FRAND principles above, the knowledge is regarded as being open in a ‘weak’ sense.389 
Openness rather refers to the unimpeded flow of knowledge via networks of strategic alliances 
through which knowledge is diffused to meet innovation needs. These alliances are often based on 
contractual tools or cooperative strategies,390 which may involve protected IP, or may operate through 
a knowledge commons or public domain.  
 At the centre of my dissertation, as delineated in Chapter Two, are two ideas: a) knowledge 
of research tools stemming from precompetitive research, often enabled by biobanks and databases, 
should be made widely available through the public domain; and, b) downstream applications of 
knowledge may need to be protected to satisfy private interests, which may in turn lead to public 
benefit as technologies are made available. In the following sub–sections, it is explored how the 
public domain and knowledge commons, as well as specialised practices of licensing IP may be used 
to promote open collaboration. These mechanisms have been incorporated into the policies that will 
be examined further on and used to consolidate an overall policy on which to base open collaborative 
innovation. 
(i) Collaboration through the public domain and knowledge commons  
The concepts of the public domain, knowledge commons and open access have been explored in 
Chapter Two under the Human Genome Project and in Chapter Three. To summarise, anything that 
is placed in the public domain can be accessed, used and distributed by the public, and is without IP 
protection or licensing agreements.391 This is regarded as the most open type of access arrangement, 
and any collaborator of member of the public is able to access and use the knowledge for innovation, 
such as in the Human Genome Project. The OECD states that data from publically–funded research 
should fall under an open–access model as an international norm.392 
 Another means by which open access is created is through a knowledge commons, which is 
similar to the public domain but partially addresses the issue of free–riding of public goods.393 Free–
riding occurs where those who benefit from a resource do not pay for it, leading to an under–
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production of that resource, or an over–consumption.394 Knowledge is non–rival and so does not 
deplete through use, and so cannot be over–consumed like a physical good. However, there is a 
disincentive to produce knowledge if there is no commercial incentive to do so, or if the modifications 
of that knowledge are enclosed by property rights. For example, a genome sequence may be placed 
in the public domain, but a firm may develop and patent a diagnostic test using that sequence, 
diminishing the public benefit of that sequence. A knowledge commons, such as that of BIOS395 to 
be discussed below, may stipulate that users are bound to a copyleft license, that is, any cumulative 
innovation based on the knowledge of the commons must be placed in the commons for its users to 
access and use without restriction, and each user’s input will add to the value of the goods.396  A 
knowledge commons, such as BIOS397, may also be created within a certain community, in which 
parties may have to pay membership fees for open access, reiterating that ‘open’ is not synonymous 
with free of cost. The aim of this measure is not to restrict access, but rather to create sustainability 
of the commons. It may also be that only members of the commons enjoy unrestricted use of the IP 
through copyleft licensing,398 whilst other users may have separate arrangements with the licensor, 
allowing for financial gain. This would encourage entities to become members, increasing the pool 
of knowledge and subsequent benefits to scientific progress.  
 These models of open access suit precompetitive research where commercial entities are more 
willing to waive their IPRs to participate with public entities and develop a strong foundation for 
future innovation, such as in the Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI). However, to translate such 
research into viable downstream technologies is highly risky, costly and requires clinical trials and 
regulation. For these reasons, without a means of capturing financial value, commercial entities may 
be unwilling to collaborate in purely open access initiatives, without IP protection for downstream 
technologies. Recognising this, protected IP may still be used as a specialised tool for co-ordinating 
collaborations.399 For example, many national policies and guidelines from state health departments 
and funding bodies encourage the commercialisation of technology by the traditional basic science 
hubs — academia and the public–sector — through exploitation of IPRs,400 and through collaboration 
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with industry.401 Two such tools – patent pools and clearing houses –402 will be discussed below as a 
means of coordinating collaboration whilst retaining capture of financial value for licensors of IP. 
However, without an effective open strategy to guide this process, knowledge can be hedged in and 
its benefits to a wider population reduced. Thus it is important for entities to consider how an IP 
strategy may be used to sustain open innovation, in which value is created and captured by many, not 
just a single entity. 
(ii) Patent Pools and clearinghouses 
The characteristics of the various licenses used in transferring knowledge and technology has been 
described above. To reiterate, licenses may be exclusive, semi–exclusive or non–exclusive in nature, 
which determine to what rights licensees and licensors are entitled. The practice of licensing has been 
used in the closed model of innovation, and is a vital practice of Chesbrough’s firm–centric open 
innovation.403 Open collaborative innovation initiatives, such as BIOS404 or 100KGP405, also use 
licensing to create openness. Licenses create openness when the knowledge flow is maximised, which 
occurs when multiple licensees are allowed by the licensing structure, as in a non–exclusive license, 
and when the total costs of the license are not prohibitive. Patent pools and clearinghouses have the 
potential to maximise the licensing of knowledge and technologies whilst reducing the overall costs 
to licensees, as will be explored below.  
 Patent pools and clearinghouses, often referred to as collaborative licensing models, are 
intermediary tools that enable access to multiple inventions through aggregating information and 
technologies, thus reducing search and transaction costs and streamlining the licensing process.406 
These tools involve numerous licensors and licensees, as opposed to only a few as in bilateral 
licensing.407 In a patent pool, licensors may license their patents out to each other by way of a multi–
party agreement, and then bundle their patents and license out the bundle to a third party. As a one-
stop license, these mechanisms reduce the number and complexity of negotiations and the high 
transactions costs incurred through multiple bilateral licenses, and may standardise license terms to 
provide greater legal certainty.408  A prudent pool would also vet the patents that are pooled to verify 
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that these are valid and enforceable to prevent unnecessary litigation. Additionally, a patent pool 
consists of complementary technologies or information, rather than those that are competing or are 
substitutes for each other.409 
 Over the years, patent pools have emerged involving public and private actors, many of which 
targeted the treatment or prevention of infectious diseases such as malaria (Medicines Patent Pool) 
or neglected tropical diseases (BIO Ventures for Global Health pool). Though not directly related to 
human genomic medicine, these pools will need to include parties that have an understanding of the 
genomes of the infectious agents, as in the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) pool. 
However, although private and public actors are involved, these pools are humanitarian in their 
objectives, and it is yet to be seen how pools in genomic medicine that incorporate private interests 
will work.  
 A clearinghouse is an intermediate platform that acts as a matchmaker service between 
licensors and licensees to exchange information or technology. As a neutral intermediary service that 
standardises licensing terms, such as the Science Commons,410 and that may bundle licenses, the 
clearinghouse eliminates engagement between the licensors and licensees.411 This reduces 
negotiations and transaction costs, provides visibility for licensors, and cuts down on the searching 
process by licensees.412 Clearinghouses may also engage in other activities, such as royalty collection 
and dispute management.413  
 Two pertinent examples of clearinghouses include MPEG LA’s Librassay414 and DSM’s SNP 
Nutrigenomics.415 Librassay aims to aggregate patents for existing and emerging diagnostic tests that 
bear on personalised treatment of diseases, and non-exclusively license out this bundle for diagnostic 
use.416 The success of the clearinghouses is still to be established. DSM, through its SNP 
Nutrigenomics clearinghouse seeks to reduce patent thickets around genetic variations called SNPs, 
particularly regarding personalised nutrition. By providing standard licenses, it hopes to encourage 
companies to develop genetic tests for personalised nutrition, but the uncertainty of such a market has 
discouraged potential parties from collaborating.417 This suggests that whilst patent pools and 
clearinghouses have promise as mechanisms of open innovation, they are heavily dependent on the 
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willingness of actors to participate to create a critical mass of information and technology that makes 
the platform viable.418  
 By enabling access to multiple inventions, patent pools and clearinghouses may overcome the 
problems of patent thicketing as all relevant patents may be included in a bundle of rights, especially 
where the development of an innovation is dependent on using multiple research tools like genomic 
sequences. Both patent pools and clearinghouses are mechanisms to enhance the licensing process 
needed in open innovation models. However, these simplify the process of licensing, and may not 
necessarily lead to technology transfer and distribution without suitable policy that promotes these 
aims.419 Furthermore, the interests of parties that may be from different sectors must be aligned, and 
competing technologies should not be included in the same pool.420 And as other commentators have 
noted, patent pooling can tend towards anti-competitive practices. To keep within the IP law focus of 
this dissertation, this will not be discussed further, but future policy should consider this. As yet, 
neither mechanism has seen extensive and broad success in the life sciences or genomic medicine, in 
particular. Although as models that require broad licensing, such open collaborative innovation, are 
more frequently adopted, these tools may be refined and used more widely, which would need to be 
pre-empted by policy.   
(d) The shift to open collaborative innovation 
Pharmaceutical companies, core biotechnology firms (such as SMEs) and public research institutes 
(such as universities and NPOs) are looking to expand their current operations in personalised 
medicine activities, which would benefit public health interests. Pharmaceutical companies have 
largely relied on blockbuster models of innovation in conventional medicine, where incremental 
changes are made to an existing, successful invention.421 But the field of genomic medicine is nascent 
and different from conventional medicine, as discussed in Chapter Two, and requires breakthrough 
innovations to capture consumer interest and meet their needs. To bring about such breakthroughs, 
the following activities are critical in the innovation chains: extensive precompetitive research and 
discovery of genomic knowledge; innovative application of this knowledge to generate inventions; 
and effective distribution of these inventions to satisfy consumer interests. This highlights the 
importance of knowledge in driving genomic medicine. However, under a closed innovation model, 
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these entities are faced with stagnated knowledge — either knowledge that is obsolete, or knowledge 
that cannot be translated into useful innovation by that entity because the boundaries of these entities 
are closed. In this way, knowledge cannot flow to where it would be used most effectively, for 
example, key information on genome variants associated with a disease discovered by a university 
may enable an SME to develop a genomic test. To assist these knowledge flows, the boundaries of 
these entities need to become more permeable, which may be facilitated by strategic alliances and 
collaborations,422 for example, Merck’s Gene Index423 discussed in the previous chapter. In this 
dissertation, the main focus is on the collaboration between public and private sectors, with an 
emphasis on public biobanks and databases. 
 Clarke and Turner424 note that a salient characteristic of the biotechnology industry is that of 
collaborations between various actors such as universities, biotechnology SMEs and large companies 
(often pharmaceutical-based) and not-for-profit organisations.425 The alliances within collaborations 
may be vertical, which brings in new upstream knowledge and allows for commercialisation 
downstream, or horizontal, which brings in the complementary knowledge of competitors. 
Networking arising from webs of vertical and horizontal alliances is also powerful, as Powell notes, 
in the biotechnology industry, innovation is a result of networks, not individual firms.426 The Diabetes 
Genetics Initiative427 is a pertinent example of collaboration between the Broad Institute of 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Harvard, Lund University, and Novartis Institutes 
for BioMedical Research where the expertise and resources of these collaborators are combined to 
collect and analyse the genomes of diabetic patients so as to understand the genomic variants 
contributing to Type 2 Diabetes.428 
 The importance of collaborative innovation in genomic medicine can be attributed to various 
reasons, as outlined below, many of which are proposed by the Genomic Medicine Colloquium429 – 
the overall reasoning is very few firms have the internal capacity to take a product through from 
research to commercialisation, for reasons of time, cost, resources and regulatory approval.430. Firstly, 
genomic medicine is dependent on highly complex technologies in both diagnostics and therapeutics, 
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which should be developed together to optimise their benefits. This complexity is partially attribute 
to the nature of genomics — to understand a single disease through genomics, a web of multiple 
genomic elements may have to be studied. This complexity calls for greater human and financial 
resources than a single firm may be able to provide. 431 Open collaboration creates networks of 
partners and transparency, and where initiatives are geared towards a common R&D goal, 432 the 
activities of innovation may be democratised, reducing overlapping research and duplication. 433 Such 
transparency and distribution of tasks will also enable collaborators to work on cumulative innovation 
and concurrent technologies and accelerate development in the field. Furthermore, as the focus shifts 
away from only producers to include users of technologies, diagnostic and therapeutic technologies 
can be customised within the collaborative initiative, potentially expanding the range of user of the 
downstream technologies. 434 A hypothetical example would be where a collaborating commercial 
laboratory finds that testing for breast and ovarian cancer is more appealing to patients than only 
testing for one type of cancer, and uses the network to communicate this to producers of the test. The 
networks of collaboration creates a platform not only to share IP and funding, but also expertise and 
skills in applying new knowledge.435 Balancing the development of resources and relations is needed 
in such a highly complex field that requires interoperability and convergence of technologies and 
knowledge to address the needs in diagnostics and therapeutics. 436 Companies, like Roche, are 
recognising that collaboration may aid them in achieving breakthrough inventions and assisting the 
shift from the blockbuster model that relies on incremental adjustments to existing technologies. 437  
 Secondly, the tools used and the technologies required by the field undergo rapid evolution 
may be too costly for a single entity to constantly update their tools and develop new technologies. 
As with other branches of medicine, genomic medicine is a high–investment and high–risk field that 
requires value capture, although private entities are observing that patenting may not always result in 
such capture, as explained by the ‘Valley of Death’ phenomenon.438 In this phenomenon it is observed 
that patented inventions do not necessarily become commercialised. This may fall into an abyss 
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because the costs between the processes of patenting and commercialisation in the medical field is 
higher than in other fields of technology (noting the additional step of regulation). Moreover, as 
populations are stratified according to genomic sub-populations, there is a risk of market failure as 
the consumer bracket for a product becomes smaller as compared to the larger populations for which 
conventional medicine caters. Collaborative efforts, whether by private or public actors, or both, share 
these risks and investments, as discussed in the previous section, and can pool resources and reduce 
transactions costs and time–consuming negotiations,439 especially regarding the use of patent pools.  
 Thirdly, genomics is also highly susceptible to the effects of patent thickets, as genome 
sequences cannot be substituted.440 Open collaborative innovation that creates more open access 
through specialised licensing agreements, such as copyleft licenses or patent pools, or stipulations to 
preserve the knowledge in the public domain, can reduce the number of patents placed on essential 
research tools that are needed for precompetitive research, such as in the Merck Gene Index.441 Such 
preservation of the public domain or knowledge commons reduces the threat of patent infringement 
and litigation, and attracts scientists to the field. Open collaborative innovation lessens the uncertainty 
of research exemptions, whereby scientists in public research institutes may be hesitant to engage in 
precompetitive research as countries either do not have explicit laws or guidelines, or in some cases 
have very strict rulings from courts. For example, the US federal court ruled that research exemptions 
should only apply ‘when research is solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strict 
philosophical inquiry’.442 Such a narrow view of this exemption is possibly influenced by legislation 
such as the Bayh-Dole Act443 that promotes publically-funded bodies to patent inventions. Narrowing 
the scope prevents public entities from exploiting the exemption to further their commercial interests 
without proper due compensation for the patent holder. Collaborative networks that are based on 
private contracts between parties, informed by policy and law, provide an opportunity for researchers 
and patent holders to communicate the terms of research exemptions.  
 Lastly, open collaborative innovation engenders social responsibility by firms in terms of 
patenting and licensing practices by facilitating greater access for further innovation and social benefit 
without jeopardising the firm’s sustainability. In such open innovation, where the boundaries of a 
firm are willingly made more permeable, commercial entities agree to avoid strategies of secrecy in 
precompetitive stages to maintain a competitive advantage downstream. As suggested by Melese et 
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al ,‘Establishing areas of precompetitive research, with open standards and protocols, would enable 
companies to pool their knowledge and resources to fill current technology gaps’.444 
 
II.  The role of IP policy in open collaborative innovation 
 (a)  A consolidation of IP Policies to promote open collaborative innovation in genomic 
medicine 
As explained in Chapter Two, biobanks and genomic databases are essential in generating genomic 
knowledge and in supporting precompetitive research. A primary mission of many large–scale public 
biobanks is to make these data accessible to the scientific community so as to maximise the research 
output for downstream innovation.445 The approach of sharing data on DNA sequences was endorsed 
by the Bermuda Principles,446 and the role of resource producers, users and funding agencies in doing 
so was reiterated by the scientific community in 2003.447  These are rich sources of primary 
knowledge and expertise, databases and biobanks are valuable as platforms for private–public 
partnerships and collaborations, which are useful in decentralising the innovation process and 
accelerating the generation and translation of genomic knowledge into applications for patient 
benefit.448  
 However, the heterogeneity of collaborative partners from public and private sectors leads to 
diverse views on: a) how samples and databases should be accessed; b) whether IP should be granted 
to inventions stemming from research on their samples; and c) how such IP should then be governed, 
considering the public good nature of the knowledge in databases discussed in Chapter Three. 
Currently, there is no binding international consensus or comprehensive framework, as found in an 
OECD report on the ‘issues of ownership, commercialisation, exclusive licensing, access for 
researchers, benefit sharing and other issues’ regarding population databases,449 thus leaving these 
issues to the policy–makers of the biobanks and databases. The Universal Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights states that human genome in its natural state will not give rise to financial 
                                                          
444 Melese et al (note 421 above; 507). 
445 S Fortin et al ‘“Access Arrangements” for Biobanks: A Fine Line between Facilitating and Hindering 
Collaboration’ (2011) 14 Public Health Genomics 105. 
446 Bermuda Principles (note 218 above). 
447 Ibid 106. 
448 P Hofman et al ‘Public–private relationships in biobanking: a still underestimated key component of open 
innovation’ (2014) 464 Virchows Arch 3. 
449 OECD Creation and Governance of Human Genetic Research Databases (2006) 61. 
76 
 
gains,450 and favours free access to and sharing of data under a collaborative framework. However, 
this declaration pays little attention to the translation of such data in useful medical applications. 
Biobanks and genomic databases, such as the 100KGP,451 have acknowledged that IP frameworks 
are essential in their governance of common pool resources used in research, especially where there 
are private participants and commercialisation is essential to the distribution of innovation. IP policy 
must capture the full potential of collaborative relationships between the different sectors, and close 
the gap between basic research and its clinical translation. In this section, the policies of various open 
collaborative initiatives related to genomics that have been introduced in Chapter One, such as the 
BIOS initiative,452 the 100KGP,453 and the Diabetes Genetics Initiative, as well the OECD’s 
Guidelines,454 will be drawn on to create a framework for IP policy that can be applied in an open 
collaborative model of innovation.455  
 The open collaborative model, highlighted in the above section, is a modification of 
Chesbrough’s firm–centric open innovation model; the former incorporates a mixture of actors from 
the private and public sectors. This means that innovation policies, which include IP policies, should 
also be modified to fit the objectives of collaboration, that is, where there is a network of actors who 
benefit jointly from the collaboration, even if they do not have a common research goal. Thus, policy 
should encourage the development of open strategy where collaborators ‘actively shape the external 
conditions to facilitate the development of a joint innovation strategy where all partners can 
benefit’456, rather than a system of immediate bartering knowledge for a short–term open innovation 
effort. Partners from different sectors have different interests, as discussed throughout this 
dissertation, all of which must be met by policy to promote the sustainability of the open collaboration 
by attracting contributors,457 aligning research agendas, disseminating collaboration results, or using 
IP strategies to promote further innovation and prevent unsuitable appropriation of the results 
emerging from the collaboration.458 A good example of open strategy is the Merck Gene Index459 
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discussed in the previous chapter. Philanthropy aside, Merck attracted partners using the bait of a 
common objective — to prevent the appropriation of valuable knowledge that would influence their 
independent commercial activities downstream. In doing this, whilst Merck relinquished any rights 
to the genetic markers in the index, it also encouraged others to do the same, creating a valuable 
knowledge commons that would enable greater downstream innovation and value capture, rather than 
only capturing value on a few patented genes. This initiative upheld the tenets of open collaboration 
by encouraging entities to make their boundaries permeable to allow knowledge to flow out (into a 
commons) for use by others, promoting the democratisation of precompetitive research and enabling 
the diffusion of knowledge for further innovation whose social and financial value may be captured. 
460   Based on these principles, encapsulated by many IP and licensing policies of guiding bodies, such 
as the OECD, and collaborative initiatives by biobanks and databases, and how IP policy should be 
framed so as to promote open collaborative innovation will be outlined.  
 In the previous section, there is an exploration of how knowledge flows are created in open 
collaborative innovation through the public domain and knowledge commons and specialised 
licensing that endeavours to preserve open access to knowledge. As mentioned in that discussion, 
IPRs do not necessarily have to be negated, but must be used creatively to avoid creating obstacles to 
accessing knowledge, as IPRs still have a role in attracting venture capital and external investment, 
as well as commercial entities such as large pharmaceutical companies.461 IPRs for research tools 
(although this is not ideal, as discussed in Chapter Three) or downstream innovations should not be 
disproportionately allocated in collaborations; collaborators should receive the rights according to 
their contribution. 
 Many collaborations, especially those initiated by the public sector, such as health 
departments or the MRC, include universities and public research institutions. These are regarded as 
prolific producers of basic research that can be licensed out in accordance with open policy that 
encourages data–sharing.462 The policies of these national bodies should balance commercialisation 
needs with open access, and should stipulate that collaborators incorporate data–sharing plans in their 
research proposals. 463 In cases where exclusive licensing is preferable, such as when considerable 
investment is needed to distribute a technology, policy should include an agreement that licensees 
fulfil the requirement to exploit the invention and agree to milestones in the event of 
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commercialisation.464 Furthermore, where national legislature or policy prefer licenses held by 
research institutions to be granted to NPOs and SMEs,465 such provisions must not hamper the flow 
of knowledge to other actors such as large pharmaceutical companies, which could adversely affect 
the distribution of goods in genomic medicine as commercialisation may not be optimally executed. 
 To create sustainability and promote open access, national policy could instruct publically-
funded bodies to dedicate a percentage of their output to the public domain where it is applicable.466 
Policies of individual collaborative initiatives have also recognised the value of preserving a 
commons for research tools, for example, the Diabetes Genetics Initiative aims to make its work 
readily available at no cost to academic institutions and NPOs,467 and BIOS states that ‘enclosure 
rarely ensure[s] a sustainable competitive advantage’.468 This implies that a fragmented hegemony 
on critical tools does not actually benefit firms, and is a waste of innovation resources, for example, 
if various genome sequences involved in diabetes are patented by different firms, a single firm will 
not be able to develop effective technologies without licensing-in other patents. For research tools to 
be effective in innovation, broad access, in which multiple components are publically accessible, 
needs to be realised. In his theory on patents as data aggregators, explored in Chapter Three, Burk 
highlights that genomic data is more powerful when coordinated at one point, for example, if Myriad 
held all the data on the BRCA gene variations, instead of the dataset being fragmented, this single 
firm would be able to develop more impactful diagnostics tests.469 Burk suggests that patents are key 
in allowing this aggregation of data at a single point, or even to control the coordination points through 
licensing. In a closed innovation model, a patent monopoly favours data aggregation, but limits the 
R&D capabilities of other interested researchers who do not hold the patent rights through licensing. 
In open innovation, the flow of knowledge will require either open access to data or extensive 
licensing. In moving away from closed innovation, large–scale biobanks and databases that pool 
resources into a commons or in the public domain, may also function as coordination points as they 
provide robust sample sets and datasets for research, and can adopt open licensing practices.   
 Although, merely placing knowledge in the public domain may not prevent others from 
appropriating the data by combining it in their own cumulative innovation; BIOS470 recognises that 
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genome sequences placed in the public domain may be captured by ‘converting that information into 
economically valuable goods and services’.471 BIOS proposes the solution of a copyleft licensing 
obligation, discussed above, in its open licensing agreements to grant rights to BIOS in any 
improvements made on the licensed technology, which will be placed in a protected commons to 
prevent those who incrementally improve on a technology from enclosing that technology in a patent. 
Thus, licensees may not appropriate developments to technologies licensed out by BIOS and prevent 
access by others or fostering of growth of the knowledge commons.472 The HapMap project, which 
seeks to identify shared genetic variations across populations, also addresses this problem of 
commons appropriation using a click-wrap license where users have to click to agree to the terms of 
the project before being able to use the information — these terms include users agreeing not to 
combine the data of the project with their own results and enclose the project’s data in a patent.473  
 However, although a commons model and the public domain may be suitable for 
precompetitive knowledge and vital research tools, this may not always be a feasible option to 
incentivise participation in a collaboration; IPRs may still be regarded as essential to value capture 
from downstream innovation. It is my suggestion that IPRs only be used to capture value from 
downstream applications, and appropriation is deferred until is in undeniable that the invention meets 
the criterion of patentability, which needs to be clarified by TRIPS or national policy and legislation, 
as discussed in Chapter Three.474  Policy should ensure that IPRs promote knowledge flow through 
open licensing practices, as used by BIOS475 and the Diabetes Genetics Initiative which follow the 
FRAND principles discussed above, and favour non–exclusive licensing. Before open licensing 
becomes attainable, there must be clarity as to how IPRs are assigned to collaborators. This is 
especially pertinent considering that national legislation in some countries, such as the US and SA, 
encourages patenting of publically–funded research by assigning IPRs to public actors such as 
universities, as discussed in Chapter Three. Policy should clarify how the IPRs on the collaboration’s 
results are to be assigned between collaborators, and how non–holders may use the IP post–
termination of the collaboration. 476 Open collaborations should differentiate between precompetitive, 
non–commercial research, and competitive, commercial R&D. This may allow for a tiered system of 
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IPRs, as seen in the 100KGP,477 where non–commercial academic researchers assign all IPRs to the 
100KGP parent body, Genomics England, to avoid a fragmentation of rights and to create a 
knowledge coordination point. Should researchers intend to commercialise any technologies using 
Genomics England IP, the two parties will negotiate a ‘fair and reasonable’ license.478 Genomics 
England will also share any profits with institutions that contributed to the IP enclosed in the 
license.479 However, forgoing any IPRs as an academic institution may not always seem appealing, 
especially when IPRs are used to attract investment or commercial partners, or build a reputation.  
 Genomics England also has an IP policy for commercial entities, which are tiered according 
to size. Where companies collaborate in 100KGP,480 any IP that arises will be owned by Genomics 
England, but where companies solely develop technologies using Genomics England information, 
without collaboration, the company retains all IPRs. In the former scenario, such a policy may deter 
commercial collaborators as IPRs have to be relinquished, although it does create a strong knowledge 
base for 100KGP. In the latter, openness is substituted for sustainability as IPRs holders either have 
to pay royalties or a larger upfront fee, depending on their size. 481 This business model approach to 
collaboration, where profits are derived from IP, may certainly support sustainability, however 
commentators at the IP Policy Workshop held by the Centre for Science and Policy, Cambridge,482 
have queried whether a government–based initiative should support the capture of financial value, 
instead of the traditional focus in supporting innovation through infrastructure and funding. From this 
arises the concern of how to balance openness with value capture so as to cater for public and private 
interests, which are dependent on the nature of the collaborators, the complexity and potential of the 
field, and the long–term goals of the collaboration. 
 Another option to keep the boundaries of collaborators permeable and maintain a knowledge 
flow is where IPRs are jointly held by collaborators, and in the cases where a collaborator cannot 
hold the IPRs, open licensing should enable them to access the information easily, encouraging their 
participation in the initiative. Creative licensing agreements could also be used to prevent a hegemony 
over knowledge, for example, jointly–held IPRs or exclusive licenses could be licensed according to 
geography, field of use and time, without infringing competition law483, as recommended by the IP 
policy for 100KGP. 484  Hypothetically, companies A and B could each hold IPRs in different 
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countries simultaneously, or hold IPRs in the same country at different times. Where a technology 
has patents on multiple uses, such as a diagnostic test for breast and ovarian cancers, A could hold 
the IPRs for the use of the test in breast cancer diagnosis, whilst B could hold the IPRs for ovarian 
cancer diagnosis.  
 Furthermore, open collaborative initiatives should make core external knowledge available 
for licensing if it is not already in the public domain. This knowledge is not the IP of the initiative, 
but is externally sourced from third parties by collaborators in order to innovate. For example, 
Genomics England, a subsidiary of the UK Department of Health, may claim ownership of whole 
genome sequence datasets of third parties if these datasets are used by 100KGP academic researchers 
in creating their own IP for a hypothetical invention ‘C’, depending on whether the datasets were 
created using public funds.485 By doing this, Genomics England ensures that licensees who seek to 
use C for further innovation can acquire critical research tools to fully understand C and optimise 
innovation without having to enter negotiations with the third party and pay exorbitant transactions 
costs.486 However, before adopting such measures, policy–makers need to evaluate whether this 
appropriation of external IP does not discourage third parties from allowing collaborators to use their 
data. As this data is publically–funded, funding bodies should clearly communicate in their own IP 
policy the possibility of a governmental subsidiary claiming ownership of core data. 
 Open licensing should be available to third parties so as to maintain a flow of knowledge, and 
where IPRs align in research, patent pools could be orchestrated to facilitate licensing within the 
collaboration and with third parties. Again, the assignment of the resultant IP from third party 
collaboration should be clearly guided by policy.487 In Nicol’s analysis of cooperative IPRs in 
biotechnology, 488 it is suggested that databases and biobanks such as BIOS or 100KGP act as 
coordination points of knowledge, and through their IP policy, can act as patent pools.489  Open 
collaborations could also participate in clearinghouses to maximise the dissemination of their IP, and 
policy would have to address how this may be conducted. Clearinghouses and technology transfer 
offices, or similar mechanisms within a collaboration, should be used to correctly evaluate IP for fair 
licensing. 490  However, for patent pools and clearinghouses to be effectively formed, policy would 
also need to address the possibly negative perception entities have of patent trolls and clearinghouses 
that may have thus far contributed to the slow growth of these mechanisms, for example parties 
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believe that they will lose control over the bargaining process, to their determines.491 Furthermore, in 
genomic medicine, these mechanisms would need to assemble multiple key patented technologies, 
which would need to be clearly marketed to prospective licensees. If these technologies are not 
verifiably critical to further innovation, prospective licensees may fear wasting financial and human 
resources on buying into these license bundles, and attempting to develop using these patented 
technologies. Effective policy would appease these licensees if it articulated clear instructions on how 
patent pools and clearinghouses vet patented technologies, although achieving this may be unrealistic 
as it is not always easy to evaluate a technology. Furthermore, licensors may fear that their 
technologies are undervalued, discouraging their participation.  
 Licensing of IP is an important means of knowledge diffusion and distribution of applicable 
technologies. The OECD Guidelines492 provide best practices that would enable diffusion of 
knowledge and financial and social value capture to satisfy private and public interests. The objective 
of the Guidelines is to foster innovation and make this readily available for maximum utilisation 
through non–exclusive licensing to promote a healthy competitive environment that would meet the 
commercialisation needs of public demand, 493  and would enable licensors and licensees to obtain 
returns on their investment. 494 In accordance with the principle of reasonableness in FRAND 
licensing, the Guidelines recommend that best practice minimise the burden of royalties, upfront fees 
and transaction costs, and reach–through licenses, discussed in Chapter Three, as these may hinder 
access to downstream innovation and discourage inventors. 495   
 Particularly in relation to research activities, which would encompass the agendas of genomic 
databases and biobanks, the Guidelines recommend that information, particularly foundational 
genetic inventions,496 is rapidly disseminated through broad licensing and unrestricted access to 
databases. Where research results are kept confidential for patenting, this should not unduly hamper 
the eventual publication of such results in the public domain or knowledge commons.497 
 In the event that IPRs are not used to capture financial value through monopolies and social 
value through dissemination of innovation, policies should consider how value is to be captured, and 
how knowledge spill–overs are to be patented or otherwise treated as public goods. 498 Where 
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knowledge flow is encouraged through open access that reduces a commercial entity’s ability to 
derive profit from IP protection, there must be an alternative rewards system. These rewards may still 
be pecuniary, as in prizes for open innovation, or could be non–pecuniary, as in social rewards.499 
The latter could include prestige and recognition derived from open challenges, a reputation of 
openness, refinement of skills and gain in expertise through peer interactions and exposure to new 
ideas.500 A significant development in this area of alternative rewards systems is in the InnoCentive 
open initiative where solutions are sourced from the public knowledge flows, termed crowdsourcing, 
and rewarded socially and monetarily. Policy must clearly outline these rewards for sharing IP and 
create realistic paths for participants to gain these.  
 Collaboration policy offers a platform for standardising activities that are not clearly legislated 
or regulated by national policy. Ideally, national policy and open collaboration policy should 
standardise research exemption licenses to clarify how research may be conducted in collaborative 
innovation. This would reduce uncertainty about facing infringement litigation. On that point, IP 
policy should provide clear IP dispute resolution mechanisms.  
 The policy guidelines,501 consolidated from various sources, attempt to promote the principles 
of open collaborative innovation discussed in this chapter. Policy is dependent on national laws, but 
can also provide certainty in areas that the law does not address. The innovation policies of individual 
collaborations or overarching bodies, such as the Medical Research Council (MRC) can be more 
specific in how IP is managed in particular fields, for example, whether genomic research tools can 
be patented. In its IP policy, Genomics England states that it does not intend to own the genomes of 
any individual, 502 or patent isolated sequences,503 nor does it support patenting overly broad claims 
that may hinder further innovation.504 Overarching bodies, such as medical research councils or 
national research foundations, play a critical role in promoting a research agenda that addresses public 
health needs through the collaboration of the public and private sectors – for example, funding bodies 
could stipulate that grant–holders engage in open collaborative practices. The IP policies of these 
national bodies should favour governmental health services, as seen in the 100KGP505 where a 
particularly favourable licensing regime will be considered for the National Health Service in 
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alignment with the 100KGP objectives to ‘bring benefit to NHS patients’.506 Using the case of the 
South African MRC, the role of its IP policy in fostering open collaborative innovation will be 
explored, juxtaposing its policy with the consolidated framework above.507 However, as open 
collaborative innovation develops, and healthcare needs change, a single, static framework would not 
be advantageous. As suggested in the preface of the OECD Guidelines,508 guidelines and policy 
should be dynamic, evolving in light of scientific progression, and changes in business practice and 
societal needs.509 
 
(b)  The promise of South African IP policy in open collaborative innovation 
According to the OECD, SA is ‘the continent’s leading economy, with strong research–based 
industries’510 and ‘related knowledge–intensive business services’ and ‘knowledge infrastructure’.511 
Research and innovation are significantly influenced by domestic industry–academic networks,512 
and as Gastrow finds, these networks are incorporating open innovation.513 Furthermore, international 
collaboration has a role in scientific publication and patenting, as per the OECD’s findings, indicating 
that knowledge flow is occurring on the domestic and international fronts. However, despite these 
positive indicators, there is an imbalance in the participation of the private and public sectors in the 
biotechnology industry — the OECD reports that whilst government funding of R&D doubled, the 
figure by businesses hardly increased.514 Jordaan suggests that public policy on the level of national 
strategy, which largely excludes the private sector, contributes to the reluctance of private sector to 
contribute to the industry.515 This imbalance has the potential to impede the growth of a strong 
genomic knowledge base and, more pertinently, to hinder the translation of this knowledge into 
downstream technologies and the distribution of these technologies to capture their value. At a 
meeting convened by SA’s Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), policymakers and 
leading researchers identified that in order to create affordable products and services, universities, 
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research councils and industry must closely network,516 and called for a policy that promotes not only 
networking, but the growth of these sectors, possibly assisted by collaboration. Thus, it is critical to 
understand the current public policy landscape to determine how the innovation chain in genomic 
medicine may be hampered, looking at this through the lens of open collaborative innovation. In 
Chapter One, the past national strategies aimed at building the biotechnology industry in South Africa 
were briefly outlined, and in this section, the focus is on two current IP policies that have a bearing 
on innovation in this field: the Draft Intellectual Property Policy of SA Phase 1 (2017),517 and the 
Medical Research Council’s IP Policy.518 
 
(i) The Draft Intellectual Property Policy of SA Phase 1 (2017) 
In the Draft Intellectual Property Policy of SA Phase 1 (2017) (Draft Policy),519 under the Department 
of Trade and Industry, IP is recognised as an important policy instrument in ‘promoting innovation, 
technology transfer, research and development (R &D), creative expression, consumer protection, 
industrial development and more broadly, economic growth’.520 The Draft Policy also aims to 
transition from an ‘over-reliance’521 on natural resources to a knowledge economy. Though public 
health is given more attention, with this policy intending to ‘strike a balance between owners and 
users of IP’,522 SA still lags behind other jurisdictions which have specific public policies addressing 
genomics in public health, such as the EU Directive.523 This section examines how the provisions of 
this policy promote open collaborative innovation between the public and private sectors in genomic 
medicine — although its phase 2 intends to address biotechnology, this seems to be limited to 
agricultural resources.524 
 As the Draft Policy seeks to promote the growth of domestic industry,525 it is important to 
determine its reliance on national and international linkages to do this, that is, to determine whether 
a global openness is fostered. As demonstrated by the Human Genome Project and subsequent 
genomic research initiatives, the nature of research and development in genomic medicine is global 
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— research participants, and researchers and developers from around the world engage in these 
initiatives to maximise the potential of the genomic knowledge generated so as to benefit a wider 
range of genomic sub–populations. Therefore, there is a need for a national policy to facilitate 
international networking so as to access globally distributed knowledge networks that can support 
such initiatives by the public and private sectors.526 Gastrow notes that public policy does not 
currently promote the formation of global innovation networks.527 These linkages are essential in a 
field like genomic medicine, which relies on cumulative innovation and is highly complex in terms 
of its technological content,528 requiring diagnostic and therapeutic goods for a multitude of genomic 
sub-populations. As Herstad et al note, the ‘more complex knowledge bases, products or processes 
become, the higher is the direct or indirect dependence on various external sources of information, 
ideas and knowledge’.529 Open innovation on a global scale can enable broader knowledge diffusion, 
and allow domestic actors to in-source knowledge and technologies to build their R&D capacity in a 
highly complex area such as genomic medicine, especially in the cases of developing countries. 
Furthermore, these international linkages may contribute to knowledge spill-overs, which can be 
transformed by domestic actors into useful technologies, if supported by policy that encourages 
networking and permeability for the flow of information. 
 However, the globalisation of genomic research does not detract from the requirements of 
domestic industries to develop. As Herstad et al observe,530 Chesbrough emphasises the use of these 
knowledge spill-overs from the knowledge commons, but this may in fact reduce domestic capability 
in the long run. If there is a perpetual dependence on external sources, domestic industries are less 
likely to invest in their own R&D, which would mean that in the long-run, knowledge flow will 
become unidirectional as opposed to bi-directional, and capacity to absorb from external sources will 
not increase dynamically in these industries.531  Cohen and Levinthal define absorptive capacity as 
‘the ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial 
ends’.532 Hence, prior knowledge created by internal R&D is essential in increasing absorptive 
capacity, and an open innovation model should accommodate both in-sourcing and internal 
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development, which may contribute to out-sourcing later on. Thus, if the Draft Policy should seek to 
foster open innovative practice, it would need to balance the formation of international linkages with 
that of domestic networking and growth.533 Currently, although the Draft Policy is unclear about how 
it would foster international linkages to achieve this balance, like the Bayh-Dole Act534 of the US, 
SA’s IPR Act articulates the need to support domestic firms, especially SMEs, and the need to develop 
policies that prioritise national linkages. Therefore, when focussing on the field of genomic medicine, 
the Draft Policy should appoint a focus group that identifies: a) how the biotechnology industry of 
SA is formed and how productive it is; b) what are the current international influences; c) how have 
comparator countries addressed the issues of domestic and international linkages in the industry; and 
d), how should SA address the same issues.  
 A key reform introduce by the Draft Policy is the application of a substantive search–and–
examination (SSE) process to stimulate ‘genuine innovation’,535 as the Draft recognises that whilst 
SA patent law provides for SSE, as discussed in Chapter Three, limited human and financial resources 
in the past have curtailed efforts to effectively apply such a process.536 Currently, only a depository 
system is employed, with SSE only be applied if the patent is challenged in litigation. This allows for 
a significant difference in patenting trends in SA as compared to comparator countries such as Indian 
or Brazil. According to a study by researchers from Harvard and Columbia, SA grants 93% of the 
patents applications, compared to India’s 19% or Brazil’s 14%. Even the US, a country which 
promulgates strong patent law, only grants 61% of the patent applications. This is an important 
flexibility that may prevent the patenting of subject matter that does not fit the criteria of inventions, 
such as isolated DNA sequences (referring to Myriad537 from the previous chapter). In this way, 
genomic sequences, research tools and inventions that do not fit the criteria may be placed in the 
public domain or in knowledge commons, but it is important that policy considers the role of secrecy 
in lieu of patenting. There must be sufficient incentive, generated by clearly–defined means of value 
capture, to share IP in collaborations otherwise entities may not publically disclose their results and 
inventions as in done patenting quid pro quo. 
 The Draft Policy also intends TRIPS flexibilities to be used optimally to meet public health 
needs. As discussed in Chapter Three, apart from the actual flexibilities stated in TRIPS, there may 
be significant room for the interpretation of its provisions, especially regarding interpreting patentable 
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subject matter criteria.538 The Draft Policy suggests that there may be a way to interpret TRIPS so as 
to allow for SSE limited to certain fields of public interests so as to accommodate for capacity 
constraints. Whilst Article 27.1 of TRIPS states that all fields of technology should enjoy patent 
rights, this does not mean that rights have to be granted through a depository system. As long as an 
alternative system, such as SSE, is used that potentially allows patents in the field, this article is not 
violated.  
 The Draft Policy also values voluntary licensing to third parties. To optimise the impact of 
voluntary licensing that promotes access and innovation through technology and information transfer, 
the Draft Policy calls for transparency regarding the terms and conditions of the licensing contract. 
The Draft Policy concurs with the IPR Act539 of SA on how publically–funded IP should be licensed, 
preferring non–exclusive licensing to SMEs and Broad–Based Black Empowerment Enterprises 
(BBEEE),540 but these preferences may not always be feasible, for example, where exclusive 
licensing may be better suited (as identified above by 100KGP)541, or where large firms are necessary 
for innovation. As the IP Policy of SA intends to propagate the ideals of the IPR Act, and promote 
the conditions of ‘fair’ licensing,542 possibly modelled on FRAND terms, the policy itself should 
delineate what these conditions are and how they can be achieved. By doing so, the policy will 
engender a national protocol on licensing that will improve technology transfer and knowledge flows 
through the public and private sector collaborators. 
 In a study conducted by Gastrow, he observed that firms, universities and public science 
institutes are all active collaborators, with evidence of open innovation.543 He also found that there 
was a great propensity to collaborate with other domestic firms or within the firm, or to collaborate 
with international firms, as well as government organisations.544 However, he finds that the greatest 
single mode of collaboration is the industry–university linkage, particularly with foreign 
universities.545 A pertinent issue to this type of linkage is that of research exemptions on patented 
inventions. The Draft Policy recognises that to promote the dissemination and advancement of 
knowledge, and ‘preserve the scope of researchers’546 provisions on research exception and 
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experimental use must be clarified.547 This clarification will ease the flow of knowledge through 
research, necessary for openness in innovation. 
 The Draft Policy, although not explicitly geared towards open innovation, recognises the 
importance of allowing knowledge to flow between the public and private sectors. Its provisions on 
granting of patents, licensing practices and research exemptions are foundational for future open 
collaboration, although the policy does not fully address the potential of patent pools and 
clearinghouses in promoting innovation. Moreover, as a national policy, there is a stronger focus on 
domestic linkages than international linkages, which may be detrimental in a global field like 
genomics. However, this policy is promising, and, together with the law, will inform how national 
bodies create innovative practices. One such body, the Medical Research Council, will be discussed 
below regarding how well suited its IP policy is to fostering open collaborative innovation. 
(ii) The Medical Research Council 
The South African Medical Research Council (MRC) is a national research body, mentioned in 
Chapter One, which includes research, development and technology transfer in its mandate on the 
improvement of public health.548 Through its Technology Transfer Unit and its Strategic Health 
Innovation Partnerships (SHIP), the MRC endeavours to partner with local universities, science 
councils and the private sector to translate its research into applications that can improve 
healthcare.549 These partnerships, occurring at different stages of the innovation chain, are indicative 
of openness in the MRC’s innovation, but the body’s IP policy will determine the level of open 
collaboration engendered by the MRC. 
 In its Management and Commercialisation of Intellectual Property Policy, the MRC identifies 
IP as a key asset,550 and sets out to identify, protect, utilise and commercialise IP emerging from its 
research, for public benefit,551 and to reward relevant stakeholders to encourage further investment.552 
As with the policy framework above, and in line with the concept of balancing heterogeneous 
interests, the policy recognises the need to achieve a ‘balance between research excellence, academic 
freedom and capacity development and the need to commercialise inventions through innovative and 
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entrepreneurial endeavour’ through the involvement of multiple actors, including the MRC, industry, 
society and IP creators.553  
 The policy aligns with the policy framework for open innovation provided above in that it 
seeks to create a flow of information through ‘open dissemination and free exchange of research 
results’,554 but like with BIOS555 and 100KGP556, values the protection and management of IP in this 
process.557 In its policy, the MRC sets out how IP ownership should occur and how benefits from its 
commercialisation should be shared between the MRC and member institutions. Unlike with 
100KGP558, the MRC is more willing to vest IPRs in the participating institutions, or to jointly own 
IP.559 The MRC is also willing to share or vest complete IP ownership with sponsors or private 
funding organisations, especially where the MRC is unable to commercialise the IP. This willingness 
to share IP ownership may be inviting for potential MRC collaborators, and could facilitate wider 
commercialisation of technologies. Moreover, the MRC will ensure that the MRC and IP creators are 
not prevented from using the IP for further research, thus maintaining a knowledge flow for 
cumulative innovation.560 The policy also provides for the exclusive or non–exclusive licensing of IP 
to third parties for commercialisation that will benefit the public, increasing the value of resources to 
consumers. Importantly, if the licensee fails to exploit the IP adequately, the MRC retains the right 
to exploit the IP itself or contract another organisation to do so, thus ensuring innovation is optimised. 
 In terms of its licensing policy, the MRC, like the initiatives examined in the above sub-
section, has a preference for non–exclusive licensing, promoting the involvement of more parties, 
and encouraging a wider dissemination of knowledge.561 The MRC also intends to limit licenses 
according to geographic location, a particular market or sector, and/or field of use, as explained in 
the policy framework above.562 Furthermore, diligence and performance clauses are attached to 
exclusive licenses to optimise their benefits.563 The MRC policy is also aligned to the IPR Act, which 
delineates the rights of the state regarding licensing and march-in rights, and which gives preference 
to SMEs and BBBEE firms, as discussed in the previous chapter, widening the range of potential 
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collaborators.564 However, the preferences to license to the SA government, or to firms (including 
joint ventures and spin–outs)565 domiciled in SA encourages national linkages over international 
linkages, which may be detrimental in the long run, as discussed under the Draft Policy.  
 To further allow for the dissemination of knowledge, the MRC does not claim ownership of 
not–for–profit academic works, but does specify that it should have indefinite, free, non–exclusive 
use of such material.566 However, commercial IP, such as databases or electronic data, which may be 
appropriated by external entities and marketed at costs that are prohibitive to knowledge 
dissemination, will be owned by the MRC unless otherwise negotiated (in which case the MRC 
retains the right to use such IP).567 Like with BIOS568 and 100KGP569, this will prevent a hegemony 
over valuable information needed for further innovation, creating a more open access environment.  
 The MRC also promotes publication of research results in line with the principles of open 
science discussed above. However, where commercial potential exists, the MRC encourages patent 
applications to be filed before results are openly communicated.570 This is not an indefinite inhibition 
of open communication of results, but to ensure that IP can be commercialised to more effectively 
benefit the public in appropriate circumstances. This commercialisation is further supported by the 
inclusion of spin–out companies and joint ventures in the IP policy, as well as licensing and placing 
invention in the public domain for open access where suitable and approved by the National 
Intellectual Property Management Office (NIPMO).571 If regulated appropriately, these commercial 
entities could strategically engage with industry and the public sector to create a network of open 
innovation to maximise the application and benefit of IP.572 The MRC, like the 100KGP,573 also 
intends on commercialising IP to generate income, which will be shared accordingly with involved 
MRC members.574 This may encourage participation in MRC research projects and may create 
sustainability for future innovation. 
 The provisions of the MRC IP policy align with the main purpose of the consolidated 
framework provided in sub-section II (a) — to create open dissemination of knowledge and free 
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exchange of research. However, the MRC, unlike the biobanks and databases examined above, does 
not have an explicit stance on creating open access databases and knowledge commons, either by 
acting as a platform, or by stipulating that collaborators do so. The MRC could take a firmer stance 
on the data–sharing responsibilities of collaborators, and could include provisions on creative 
licensing such as copyleft licensing that promotes open access. The MRC, like the Draft Policy, offers 
sparse direction on patent pooling and clearinghouses, and there is a stronger focus on domestic rather 
than international linkages. However, the MRC recognises the need to create knowledge flow and to 
capture the social and financial interests of the different actors, and sets a strong foundation for open 
collaborative innovation between the public and private sectors. With time it will be seen how the 
MRC intends to engage in innovation in genomics medicine, and whether it develops its IP policy to 
build on the foundations of open collaborative innovation it has built.  
 
III.  Conclusion 
Open innovation as conceptualised by Chesbrough has evolved and includes the model of open 
collaborative innovation – a model that is highly suitable to meeting the demands of the complex, 
global and rapidly transforming field of genomic medicine. ‘If an organisation lacks the ability to 
collaborate, it lacks the ability to innovate and grow’.575 This transition of the genomics field from 
closed to open innovation requires entities to revise their policies on innovation, including their IP 
policies. In this chapter, a consolidated IP policy framework geared towards open collaborative 
innovation is provided in section II (a), and is used as basis for examining the national Draft IP policy 
of SA and its MRC. From this comparison it appears that both the Draft Policy and the MRC recognise 
both the importance of knowledge dissemination and translation into useful applications to satisfy 
public and private interests to innovation and capture value — the licensing practices of these 
instruments align with the OECD’s Guidelines576 and of more open collaborations, such as 
100KGP577 and BIOS578, included in the consolidated framework provided above. However, neither 
offer guidance on optimising alternative mechanisms for more open collaborative knowledge transfer, 
such as patent pooling and clearinghouses. Without clear guidance, these mechanisms may not be 
considered by domestic and international actors in the industry, and may not be used optimally to 
reduce transaction and licensing costs so as to promote the maximum use of resources in innovation. 
Additionally, lack of guidance may result in intentional or unintentional anti–competitive practices 
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in those patent pools and clearinghouses that emerge, which could be deleterious to the effectiveness 
of the mechanism and could cause its premature termination by the state. 
 Moreover, although they mention opening access to information, neither the Draft Policy nor 
the MRC commit to initiating a strong scientific knowledge base, either in the public domain or as a 
knowledge commons through databases or biobanks. Rather, as found in a closed innovation model, 
there is a stronger focus on using IP for the purposes of commercialisation, rather than examining its 
role in growing knowledge bases. The provisions in the Draft Policy579 and the MRC IP Policy580 
place emphasis on how commercialisation may be promoted through domestic and international 
linkages, and through national patent law amendments, such as the review of the SSE process in South 
Africa or the IPR Act to support the dissemination of publically-funded inventions. This is promising 
for established industries that are on the precipice of commercialising their innovations. However, in 
a nascent industry like genomic medicine, where innovation must still occur at the R&D stages prior 
to commercialisation, what is first needed is the development of a strong knowledge base that can 
serve the R&D needs of the industry. Both the Draft Policy581 and the MRC IP Policy582 omit specific 
provisions on how to develop this knowledge base either at a national level or through international 
linkages. Both these policies should address how IP may be used to promote collaboration in R&D, 
and should pay greater attention to structures such as open access databases, patent pools and 
clearinghouses on a domestic and global level that could facilitate open collaboration prior to 
commercialisation. In a globalised knowledge economy, and especially in the knowledge-intensive 
field of genomic medicine, neglecting collaborative innovation in R&D that generates knowledge 
may retard long term social and financial value capture as the knowledge available to the local 
industries to innovate is diminished.  
 South Africa could draw on the experience of the UK — where the UK Department of Health 
created the subsidiary body, Genomics England, to establish and govern its 100KGP biobanks and 
database.583 South Africa similarly needs to appoint a governing body that can either oversee a 
national, publically-accessible biobank and database, or coordinate multiple fragmented databases 
and biobanks. Without engaging in an extensive discussion that is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, it is proposed that the MRC is a possible candidate, being a national research body. 
However, other institutions, such as universities, or an independent conglomeration of private and 
public actors acting in concert with the state, could also be oversight bodies in the nationalisation of 
genomic knowledge. 
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 Policy can be used to elaborate on the unclarified areas of the law, such as genome patenting 
for the benefit of public health. The Draft Policy intends to focus on public health, but its 
biotechnology focus seems to angle towards agriculture, with public policy on genomics left 
undeveloped. The gap could be addressed by the MRC, a major national research body, but its IP 
policy is vague regarding the patenting of research tools in genomics, such as genomes sequences. 
Though the limitations of this dissertation preclude a comparison with IP policies of organisations 
similar to the MRC in other countries, it would be valuable to compare their provisions of patenting 
in genomics. It is suggested that the MRC clarifies its position on genomes patenting so that 
collaborators are not deterred by uncertainty on this matter. 
 On the point of collaboration, both the Draft Policy and the MRC, like the IPR Act,584 focus 
on domestic linkages, especially regarding the public sector and small businesses. There is uncertainty 
as to how large domestic private companies are regarded in the hierarchy over the licensing policies, 
which may exclude these entities from participating in the knowledge flow and technology transfer 
required for open collaboration. From the provisions of both the policies, the preference given to 
SMEs and BBEEE firms, combined with the lack of direction regarding large multinationals, may 
also exclude these multinational firms from collaborating.  It is recommended that both policies 
encourage the inclusion of these entities in collaborations, and afford greater attention to fostering 
global linkages.  
 As the policies of both the MRC and state have significant bearing on the innovation landscape 
of South Africa, their IP policies could be used to promote the principles of open collaborative 
innovation so as to satisfy private and public interests in innovation in genomic medicine. Both the 
MRC’s IP policy and the Draft Policy have laid a foundation for open innovation through their 
recognition of the importance of dissemination of knowledge and optimal distribution of innovation, 
and their provisions on licensing align significantly with those of initiatives based in open innovation, 
as discussed under the consolidated policy framework.585 However, neither body explicitly identifies 
the value of open collaborative innovation in a field like genomics, where considerable R&D is 
necessary and would benefit not only from the growth of the domestic industry, but also from 
networking with international players. As key industry players, such as the large multinationals, are 
recognising the value of open collaborative innovation in fulfilling their own private interests in 
profit, as well as the public interest in relation to advancement in the field, the existing policies should 
adopt a firmer stance on promoting open innovation in the genomic industry. The Draft Policy is a 
national instrument, and so addressing the specific topic of open innovation in genomics may be 
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unrealistic. However, the policy could better address innovation in healthcare, which has been 
cursorily mentioned in its objectives. The MRC is in a prime position to address the specific topic of 
open innovation in genomic medicine, as it as a national body that coordinates research and governs 
key players in the field. If the MRC is to adopt a firm stance promoting openness in innovation, it 
would need to first ascertain the amenability of the domestic and international industries to adopting 
open collaborative approaches. It is found that the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries are 
accelerating in their willingness to adopt openness.  Pursuant to this, the MRC should base its policy 
on existing best practices that are evidently viable in the industry. As it has already laid a reasonable 
foundation in its IP policy for openness in innovation, as discussed above, the MRC has the potential 



























Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
Open collaborative innovation, evolved from Chesbrough’s firm-centric open innovation model, is 
based on the flow of knowledge between collaborators.586 Juxtaposed to the traditional closed 
innovation model, open collaboration uses both the public domain and knowledge commons, as well 
as IPRs to facilitate the transfer of knowledge. This open model has established itself in the software 
industry, and is budding in the biotechnology industry as players address declining R&D and 
increasing costs and complexity of technologies. Players recognise that a model promoting rapid 
breakthrough innovation is needed to satisfy: public interests to advanced health technologies; private 
interests to improved profits; and private-public interests in sustaining future innovation. As seen in 
the examples of CAMBIA’s BIOS Initiative587 and the 100KGP588, although the research goals of 
collaborators may not be aligned, there is a common vision under the initiatives to create open access 
to knowledge and sustainable innovation to meet public healthcare needs. 
 Healthcare is also evolving to adopt a more personalised approach to medical decisions. This 
personalised medicine can be based on a number of individual characteristics, and herein genomic 
medicine is discussed, where medical decisions are based on a patient’s unique genomic constitution. 
These decisions involve the use of diagnostic and therapeutic technologies that are highly complex 
and developed from extensive genomic knowledge. As a relatively nascent field, significant R&D is 
required to rapidly generate a rich source of genomic knowledge and research tools for these 
technologies to emerge, and innovation has to be optimised to apply these technologies effectively to 
address the needs of public health. Genomic databases and biobanks are critical infrastructures in the 
generation of genomic knowledge, as discussed in Chapter Two, and under a suitable model can foster 
downstream innovation by coordinating knowledge and making this available to researchers. In this 
dissertation, it is proposed that open collaborative innovation is a fitting model, as various examples 
of initiatives that employ this model in a private-public sphere, such as BIOS589 and 100KGP590, are 
used. The policies of these initiatives dictate how open collaboration may be achieved, and 
particularly focus is on their IP policies to examine the role of IP in engendering open innovation. 
These policies are dictated by international, national and regional IP law, which have been discussed 
in Chapter Three.  
 Open collaborative innovation is a model that does not only incorporate the public domain 
and knowledge commons; it is also steeped in Chesbrough’s model of open innovation that relies on 
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active IP strategy to achieve knowledge flows. Though there is a paucity of conclusive evidence on 
the impact of IPRs on innovation in genomic medicine under a closed innovation model, it is found 
that IPRs are important in the structure of open collaborative innovation, enabling licensing and 
stimulating participation of profit-seeking entities in open initiatives. For such a model to function 
optimally in genomic medicine, patent law and policy needs to be clarified. It is concurred with prior 
commentary that although there is an attempt to harmonise IP law through the international 
framework of the TRIPS Agreement, there is divergence amongst member states when it comes to 
the particulars of genomics.591 TRIPS does not elaborate on the issues of genomic patenting; rather, 
its open-ended provisions underpin the needs to transfer technology, protect inventors and satisfy 
public health goals. And as yet, there is no legal international consensus on the patenting of the human 
genomic knowledge and downstream technologies. Landmark cases, such as Myriad,592 have led to a 
review of legislation on patenting regarding biological material in certain jurisdictions, such as the 
US, but relying on litigation to ignite a response to genome patenting may not be the most effective 
and expeditious solution to providing clarification to support innovation. This is a challenge that 
South Africa faces in light of its depository system of patent application, where the criteria for 
inventiveness are not examined, and the patent is only challenged in litigation. As litigation is costly 
and time-consuming, patents may be left unchallenged despite their weak grounds for inventiveness 
and their impact on further innovation. South Africa’s Draft IP Policy593 intends to reform the 
depository system to that of a search-and-examination (SSE) system, but this will require significantly 
greater human resources. The suggestion that the SSE system should be first adopted by priority areas 
is agreeable. Considering the Draft Policy’s attention to public health, and the potential of genomic 
medicine to address public health needs, it is recommended that development and adoption of patent 
law and policy on genomics be prioritised. As this national IP policy is still in its draft phase, there 
may be ample opportunity to amend its provisions, and once this is achieved, other bodies, such as 
the MRC, may have greater clarity in building a foundation geared towards open innovation in 
genomic medicine. 
 Once the field of genomics is prioritised, the next task is to determine what constitutes a 
patentable invention. Though TRIPS594 and national legislature include the criteria of inventiveness, 
novelty and utility in their provisions, without clear guidance, there is significant room for 
interpretation. The USPTO guidelines595 and the EU Directive596 are examples of provisions that are 
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more specific in how elements of genomic medicine may be treated, although countries such as SA 
lag behind in providing clear guidance. Moreover, even although these guidelines provide clarity, 
they are divergent, and in a globalised economy of international players, initiatives in genomics that 
rely on crossing borders need aligned provisions. To address this it is firstly suggest that genomics is 
divided into a) genomic knowledge that is essential as research tools, and b) downstream applications 
of that knowledge, and that these divisions are subjected to tailored provisions, as proposed by 
BIOS.597 Drawing on Myriad598, it is then recommended that isolated DNA should be non-patentable, 
and a review of the decision on cDNA, which is also a critical research tool found to be a product of 
an obvious step found in nature, is advocated. Then, following the examples of the SNP Consortium, 
the HapMap Project, BIOS599 and 100KGP,600 it is suggested that such basic genomic knowledge is 
placed in a knowledge commons that can be freely accessed, but is protected by creative licensing 
clauses, such as click-wrap licensing or copyleft licensing, to enable sustainable open innovation 
practices. Downstream technologies should also be licensed according to open practices to maintain 
knowledge flow, which includes non-exclusive licensing and reduced licensing costs, which can be 
facilitated by patent pools and clearinghouses. 
 To optimise the potential of genomic medicine in public health, public-based infrastructures 
such as genomic biobanks and databases are critical. The South African Medical Research Council 
(MRC) is a foremost organisation of research in the country, and as such, has a vital role in directing 
the course of innovation in genomic medicine. The MRC, like other public-based initiatives in other 
countries such as the 100KGP601, can encourage the generation of vast amounts of genomic 
knowledge on sequences and their relation to disease through establishing or overseeing public 
biobanks used for research, and can coordinate this knowledge in public databases. This knowledge 
can then be used by developers in the private or public sector in downstream innovation. However, 
before fuelling the engine of genomics medicine, the MRC will need a comprehensive IP policy on 
what may be patented and what remains in the public domain, how access to resources will be 
governed, and on the particulars of licensing and the engagement of private and public actors. This is 
largely determined by the national patent laws and policies, but as these are vague on the matter of 
genomics, it is recommended that the MRC follows the emerging trend in healthcare of open 
collaborative innovation, and a comprehensive policy framework built on the IP policies on various 
open initiatives has been provided. With the initiation of the South African Human Genome 
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Programme by the Department of Science and Technology,602 the role of the MRC and public policy 
will be more prominent in guiding how the data of this project is governed to allow future innovation.  
 Although there is a focus on the transfer of resources as knowledge and technology through 
IP policy and law, the foundation of IP resides within the human resources of an entity, and for open 
collaborative innovation to be optimised, there needs to be a development of a community of 
collaboration, rather than just policy on licensing practices and how IPRs are allocated. This is based 
on Aubrey and Al-Laham’s findings that alliances based solely on licensing patents was not 
sustainable or useful,603 and that together with the knowledge-based transfer of licensing patents, it 
was also necessary to transfer relational components, such as expertise and skills of researchers.604 
The Human Genome Project is such an example, where a global community of researchers 
contributed to a common goal. However, collaboration does not necessarily necessitate a common 
goal, but rather, in the case of open collaborative innovation, a dedication to creating openness. Future 
research should explore how meaningful communities of collaborators are created and sustained, 
examining the all relevant policies, not only those limited to IP, that bear on innovation. 
 An additional point on the extensive R&D that is required in genomic medicine to understand 
and treat genome–linked diseases is that the genome is now recognised as only one aspect of disease 
aetiology from the working of the cell; a second aspect, called epigenomics, has also been identified. 
Epigenomics relates to mechanisms apart from DNA sequences that cause changes in genome 
expression.605 These mechanisms incorporate environmental influences on genome expression, which 
may even include childhood care or the lifestyle of ancestors,606 and as such, requires extensive data 
collection. Cancer is one disease in which the study epigenomics is established — scientists find that 
a certain mechanism called DNA methylation of genes is much higher in cancerous cells than in 
normal cells.607 The understanding of these mechanisms, and the technologies developed thereafter 
have led to patents, much like in genetics and genomics. Similarly, important research tools or 
diagnostic methods may be patented,608 and the field of epigenomics may be stagnated by a closed 
model of innovation, as discussed in genomics. As genomics and epigenomics operate together in the 
workings of the cell, these should be studied concurrently. Thus, when developing the IP policies for 
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an open collaboration innovation model in genomics, these policies must also consider the role of IP 
in epigenomics.  
 Lastly, whilst open collaborative innovation, based on the current trends of transition in 
innovation models in the biotechnology industry, is advocated, the model must be analysed to produce 
conclusive evidence that it is indeed a beneficial model to adopt in genomic medicine. In the long-
run, the licensing practices, knowledge sharing, and networking effects and strategic alliances609 of 
open collaborative initiatives needs to be evaluated in terms of their impact on innovation, the 
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